The Three Faces of Retainer Care by Pasquale, Frank A.
The Three Faces of Retainer Care:
Crafting a Tailored Regulatory Response
Frank Pasquale
I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................... 2
II. THE RISE OF RETAINER CARE..........................................   6
A.  Background Trends......................................................   8
B. Physician and Patient Experiences............................... 14
III. CONTROVERSY OVER BALANCE BILLING RULES........... 20
A. HHS's Ambiguous Stance............................................ 21
B. Covered vs. Noncovered Services............................... 26
IV. RESOLVING THE CONTROVERSY BY DISAGGREGATING 
RETAINER CARE SERVICES..................................................... 28
       A. Three Faces of Retainer Care....................................... 29
               1. Preventive Care.................................................... 30
               2. Queue-Jumping.................................................... 31
               3. Amenity-Bundling................................................ 34
        B. Queue-Jumping as Covered Service.......................... 35
V. SHOULD RETAINER CARE BE FURTHER REGULATED?.... 38
        A. A. Self-Limiting Phenomenon.................................... 39
B. Solving the Physician Shortage................................... 46
C. Treating the Sickest Patients?..................................... 50
D. Freedom of Contract................................................... 52
VI. CRAFTING A TAILORED REGULATORY RESPONSE.......... 56
A. Retainer Care Agreement as Insurance Contract....... 57
         B. Targeting Queue-Jumping and Amenity-Bundling 
              via Taxation............................................................... 63
VII. CONCLUSION................................................................... 67
The Three Faces of Retainer Care:
Crafting a Tailored Regulatory Response
Frank Pasquale*
INTRODUCTION
Retainer care arrangements allow patients to pay a 
retainer directly to a physician’s office in order to obtain special 
access to care.1   Practices usually convert to retainer status by
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1
 Controversies over retainer care extend even to its name.  
Congress chose the term “concierge care” in the 2003 Medicare 
Modernization and Prescription Drug Act.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc 
(2005); U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PHYSICIAN SERVICES: 
CONCIERGE CARE CHARACTERISTICS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
MEDICARE 1 (2005) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].   This term is 
unsatisfactory because opponents have tried to brand retainer 
arrangements a mere bauble of the wealthy by using the term 
“concierge care,” or the more common “boutique medicine.”  At the 
other extreme, proponents of retainer care choose terms that go beyond 
euphemism into express approbation (such as “innovative practice 
design”) or misleading synecdoche (such as “personalized preventive 
care”).  See Russ Allen, Doctors on Retainer Catch On, RISK & 
INSURANCE, Mar. 1, 2005, at 20.  “Retainer care” seems to be the best 
neutral term for discussing the financing arrangements analyzed in this 
article.    
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concentrating their attention on those willing to pay a retainer 
fee, and dropping the majority of their patients, who are left to be 
absorbed by other practices. 2   Also known as “boutique 
medicine,” “concierge care,” or “innovative practice design,” 
retainer practices have drawn thousands of enthusiastic patients.  
They have also provoked scrutiny from politicians3 and 
consumer groups.4  Few recent developments in the business of 
medicine provoke emotional conflicts like concierge care.  
Concierge physicians are thrilled to break out of the vise of 
managed care, lavishing medical attention where they used to 
face the stark choice of rationing or involuntarily donating their 
services.  Critics decry an ever-widening gap between haves and 
have-nots, and view concierge care as one more excess for the 
wealthy in an age of increasing medical scarcity.
To be sure, there are some irreconcilable ideological 
differences between the two camps.  Concierge physicians 
welcome a commodified tiering of primary care that their 
2
 Robert M. Portman, Concierge Care:  Back to the Future of 
Medicine?, 15 HEALTH LAW 1 (2003); Avram Goldstein, Doctors on 
Call–for a Hefty Retainer, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2003, at B1.  For a 
discussion of three models of boutique medicine, see John R. Marquis, 
Legal Issues Involved in Concierge Medical Practices, HEALTH 
LAWYERS NEWS, April 7, 2005, at 8.    
3 Both Congress and the Department of Health and Human 
Services have expressed concern about the access issues raised by the 
practices, and at least some affected states have responded with 
investigations and regulation.  At the national level, several bills have 
been offered to prevent physicians in retainer practices from 
participating in Medicare.  Senator Bill Nelson of Florida and 
Representative Benjamin Cardin of Maryland have introduced four 
bills so far.  None has gotten out of committee, and none appears likely 
to do so, though these legislators have managed to require the GAO to 
study the spread of concierge care and have held hearings on the topic.  
Nevertheless, Congressional attention to the topic has managed to spur 
interest at HHS.  Consumer-Directed Doctoring: The Doctor Is In, 
Even If Insurance Is Out, Hearing Before the Joint Economic 
Committee, Congress of the United States, April 28, 2004.
4
 See, e.g., Sidney M. Wolfe, A New Health Care Gimmick: 
Concierge Medicine, 19 HEALTH LETTER 10, at 1-2 (Oct. 2003); John 
Carrol, Concierge Care by Any Name Raises Ethical Concerns, 
MANAGED CARE MAGAZINE 15 (Nov. 2003), available at 
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives.
Retainer Care
4
opponents only grudgingly accept.  Yet differences also arise 
because the opposing sides have not adequately acknowledged 
the diversity of concierge care services.  Retainer contracts cover 
three analytically distinct actions: preventive care, queue-
jumping, and amenity-bundling.  Most commendably, concierge 
physicians are aggressively counseling their patients on how to 
avoid getting ill, by developing preventive health plans and 
monitoring problematic behavior. More questionably, they are 
trading enhanced access for cash—a clear example of queue-
jumping relative to their previous business practices and the 
standard of primary care prevalent in the US.  Most troublingly, 
they are bundling medical care with unrelated amenity services 
(such as lavish waiting rooms and comfort for the “worried 
well”) in order to avoid legal and regulatory bars on “balance 
billing” and multiple standards of care.
Each of these “faces” of concierge care deserves a 
different legal response.  Nearly all serious health policy analysts 
agree that preventive care is underfunded in the United States.  
To the extent concierge physicians are closing that gap, they 
ought to be encouraged.  However, concierge marketing of 
“queue jumping”—the ability to see one’s doctor far more 
quickly—and for far longer—than the norm, requires state and 
federal oversight for a number of reasons.  Tiering in the health 
insurance market has already eroded the primary “end” of health 
insurance: subsidizing the unhealthy, unlucky, and sick with 
funds from the healthy, lucky, and well. 5   Concierge care 
threatens to accelerate that process, promoting “exit” from a 
managed care system where “voice” is ever more necessary.  
Medicare policymakers realized the dangers of such a dynamic 
long ago when they proscribed “balance billing,” a practice that 
allowed doctors to charge patients themselves for parts of bills 
that Medicare did not cover.  Both Medicare and private insurers 
5
  John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 311 (1997) (“The origins of health insurance in both the United 
States and Europe involved pooling funds and sharing risk.”); Andrew 
Stark, In Sickness and in Health: Health Insurance in America, 
DISSENT MAG. 22 (Fall 2005) (“When it comes to private insurance, 
apparently, Democrats would have the rich subsidize the sick; 
Republicans seem largely content to have the healthy subsidize the 
poor.”).  
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should enforce balance billing rules against concierge doctors in 
order to prevent insurance programs from subsidizing ever-more 
fragmentation of the risk pool.
Finally, concierge physicians’ bundling of medical 
services with unnecessary amenities presents a troubling dynamic 
already reflected in the growing demand for cosmetic physical 
and mental enhancements.  Some states have begun taxing or 
otherwise discouraging these diversions of medical personnel.  
They should consider similar efforts to discourage concierge 
physicians’ efforts to bundle the sale of medical care with 
unnecessary amenities, a practice driven more by marketing 
efforts and legal concerns than actual medical care.  
This article bases these policy prescriptions on an analysis 
of current retainer care practices (Part II) and regulation (Part 
III).  Part IV suggests a resolution of the leading current legal 
controversy over retainer care, the applicability of Medicare 
balance billing rules to retainer payments.  Part V addresses 
retainer care physicians’ complaints about current and proposed 
regulation, developing a normative framework for further 
interventions proposed in Part VI.    Although states have taken 
some promising steps toward mitigating the worst aspects of 
retainer care conversions, taxation may be the only policy tool 
sufficiently targeted to reduce incentives for queue-jumping and 
amenity-bundling while promoting innovation in preventive care.
II. THE RISE OF RETAINER CARE
Boutique medicine did not arise in a vacuum.  A variety 
of pressures on providers and consumers of medical care have led 
to demand for more intense and personal primary care.  The 
development of cost-containment measures has left many 
physicians complaining about a lack of autonomy.6  Patients have 
complained about five-minute office visits, officious staff, 
6
 See, e.g., Eve A. Kerr, How Satisfied Are Physicians and 
Patients When Medical Groups Control Access to Care?, April 1997, at 
http://www.rwjf.org/reports/grr/023332s.htm (“Primary care physicians 
are significantly less satisfied with the quality of care they are able to 
deliver to patients covered by capitated contracts than those covered by 
other payment sources.”).
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interminable waits,7 and a general lack of concern about their 
welfare. 8   Even if these concerns lack empirical foundation, 
consumer perceptions of a decline in the availability and quality 
of primary care have sparked a great deal of anxiety.9  Retainer 
care options address this need by providing “Marcus Welby” 
style medical care to their patients. 
Part A below describes the background trends in the 
health care system that have given rise to retainer care, including 
time pressures on physicians, consumers’ demand for more 
services, and insurers’ efforts to placate both groups by offering 
more ala carte and tiered coverage options.  Physician and patient 
dissatisfaction with the strictures of managed care has led to 
many important trends in health care financing, including 
increased tiering and consumer choice in health plans.  Part B 
explains how retainer care works, focusing on the ways in which 
retainer physicians intensify tiering and consumer choice trends.  
7
 Gina Kolata, Sick and Scared, and Waiting, Waiting, Waiting, 
N.Y TIMES, Aug. 20, 2005, A1 (describing waits to see doctors, once in 
the doctor’s office, and for follow-up visits).
8
 Josh Fischman, Who Will Take Care of You?, U.S. NEWS AND 
WORLD REPORT, 46 (January 31, 2005).  (“Research has shown that a 
good conversation that thoroughly explores problems and possible 
treatments means better health. . . . [The] relationship [between 
physician and patient] has clearly been shown to affect diagnostic 
accuracy, adherence to treatment plans, and patient satisfaction.”).
9
 Some commentators have suggested that this is merely a matter 
of perception.  See Gottfried and Sloan, The Quality of Managed Care: 
Evidence from the Medical Literature, 65 FALL LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 103, 103 (2002). (“The empirical evidence from the medical 
literature does not support the allegations of unsafe practices made 
against MCOs by proponents of patient protection legislation. This 
finding holds despite data suggesting that generalists, who occupy a 
privileged position as gatekeepers in many MCOs, are less proficient 
than specialists in the latter's areas of expertise, because such a fact 
does not appear to translate into worse specialty care for patients in 
managed care plan.”).
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A.  Background Trends: Resistance to Managed Care   
After an extraordinary increase in health care spending in 
the 1960s and 1970s, 10  managed care arose in the 1980s in 
response to payors’ worries over increasing costs.11  Insurance 
plans controlled by doctors and hospitals had few incentives to 
limit medical care or its attendant costs.12  Managed care plans 
promised to reduce waste by leveraging the bargaining power of 
plan members in negotiations with service providers to drive 
down the costs of services and to disapprove treatment options 
with doubtful benefits.13
Of course, it is a rare medical procedure that offers no 
benefit.14 Disputes have arisen, provoking resistance to managed 
care cost-cutting from physicians (who resent the diminution of 
their autonomy) and state legislatures (which have begun to force 
disclosure of physician financial incentives and to require 
10 DAVID DRANOVE, THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN 
HEALTH CARE 34 (2000) (“At the start of the 1990s, before MCOs 
[managed care organizations] took over, private sector health spending 
was rising by more than 10 percent annually, and many experts 
predicted that health care would account for 20 percent of the GDP by 
the year 2000. . . . Thanks to MCO’s . . . total spending on health care 
remains below 14 percent of GDP.”).  
11 Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed 
Competition, HEALTH AFFAIRS 24, 26 (1993) (describing the economic 
consequences of a traditional fee-for-service health care system); Clark 
C. Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard 
Politics Make Bad Policy, 34 IND. L. REV. 395, 400 (2001).
12
 Thomas H. Greaney, Managed Care: From Hero to Goat, 47 
ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 217, 217 (2003) (“At the outset of the [1990’s], most 
observers heralded managed care as the solution to spiraling costs and a 
guarantor of quality.”).
13
 Clark Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care, 
supra note 11, at 401.  
14
 The classic health care economics term for this is “flat of the 
curve” care, which increases expenses but offers virtually no hope of 
improving outcomes.  For such a curve, the x-axis measures spending, 
and the y-axis measures some health outcome, such as Quality-
Adjusted Life-Years.  ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY 
PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARE 6 
(1980). 
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coverage of certain care).15  Despite this resistance, capitation 
systems 16  and other pressures to contain costs have already 
pervasively influenced physicians’ interactions with patients.17
Many primary care physicians must see at least 25 to 30 patients 
a day18 in order to clear between $100,000 and $300,000 per year 
15
 See Peter Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A Policy 
Whodunit, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 365 (2003); David A. Hyman, 
Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong with Patient’s Bill of Rights,
73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221 (2000) (listing examples, such as “drive-by 
delivery” legislation); David Dranove, THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION, 
supra note 10. (objecting to these laws as technology-insensitive and 
speculating about the technological advances that would have been 
deterred had “drive-by hernia” surgeries been outlawed twenty years 
ago).
16 ”Capitation is a method of reimbursement in which a fixed sum 
of money is paid per enrollee by the purchaser to the provider. This 
sum of money is expected to cover specified services for every enrollee 
for a defined period of time.”  Treatment Improvement Exchange, 
Financial Considerations, available at, 
http://tie.samhsa.gov/TAPS/TAP16/Tap16chap4.html  (last visited Feb. 
25, 2006); see also HALL, BOBINSKI, AND ORENTLICHER, THE LAW OF 
HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND REGULATION 314-330 (2005) (discussing 
capitation payment plans).
17
 C. Jackson, Premium Practice: When Patients Pay Top Dollar 
For Exclusive Care, AMEDNEWS,  Sept. 17, 2001, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2001/09/17/bisa0917.htm; Marian 
Hawryluk, Boutique Medicine May Run Afoul Of Medicare Rules, 
American Medical News, April 8, 2002; William Hoffman, Fed Up, 
Some Doctors Turn To 'Boutique Medicine,’ ACP-ASIM OBSERVER, 
Oct. 2001, available at
http://www.acponline.org/journals/news/pastobis.htm; Boutique 
Medicine: Elitist or Egalitarian?, 19(23) PHYSICIAN'S WEEKLY 10, 
June 10, 2002, ("'Primary care physicians average between 20 and 30 
patient visits each day. But the average number of 'patient contracts,' 
adding in phone calls and 'paper shuffles,' is over 110. In the last ten 
years, physician income has declined while the workload has 
increased.”).
18
 Katherine Hobson, Doctors Vanish From View, U.S. NEWS AND 
WORLD REPORT, 50 (January 31, 2005).  The average primary care 
physician sees 25 people a day.  Id.  Economic pressure on physicians 
results from a number of factors, including “reduced reimbursement 
rates, increased overhead costs, and higher premiums for liability 
insurance.”  Id.
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in pre-tax income.19  Some claim that, in response to many health 
plans’ per-patient payment methodology, doctors are beginning 
to shun the sickest patients, who take up more time than healthier 
peers.20   If a doctor fails to follow this strategy, scheduling may 
leave her with little more than 15 minutes per patient visit, 
regardless of the severity of the problem complained of or the 
complexity of the patient’s health history.
Both empirical evidence and anecdotal accounts suggest 
that primary care physicians are not happy with these 
developments.21  Many consider the strictures of managed care 
practice at best an inconvenience and, at worst, a reason for 
leaving the practice of medicine altogether.22
Given massive deficits and federal budget cutting, public 
funding of medical care is likely to become even more 
“managed” than private insurers’ plans.  Physicians are frustrated 
by concomitant government-imposed cost constraints—and since 
federal and state governments account for at least 40% of health 
19
 “In 2003, the median income for primary care physicians was 
$156,902.  For general surgeons . . .  it was $264,375. . . Busy 
orthopedic surgeons, cardiologists . . . and radiologists frequently earn 
more than half a million dollars a year.”  Atul Gawande, Piecework: 
Medicine’s Money Problem, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 4, 2005.  
20
 Newt Gingrich, A Health Threat We’re Not Treating Don’t Let 
Doctors Rig the Market for Specialty Hospitals, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 
2005, at A25 (Physicians are tending to burden community hospitals 
with the risky, expensive procedures, while referring the less expensive 
cases to the specialty hospitals in which they have a financial interest, 
despite Stark anti-kickback statutes that discourage such 
“cherrypicking.”).
21
 Brian Vastag, Physician Dissatisfaction Growing, 286 
JAMA 781 (2001); Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Time Pressures 
Leave Doctors Dissatisfied, available at
http://www.rwjf.org/reports/grr/027069.htm (“If Massachusetts mirrors 
the nation, physicians' job satisfaction has taken a hit in the past 15 
years, according to a study sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality in conjunction with the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation.”).
22
 American Academy of Family Physicians, Comparison of 
Primary Care Positions, available at
http://www.aafp.org/match/graph05.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) 
(documenting entry in (and exit from) the field).
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care spending in the U.S., these strictures are becoming 
increasingly important. 23
Those reliant on public health insurance programs, such 
as Medicaid and Medicare, have had even more cause for 
concern.  Objecting to low reimbursement rates, some doctors 
refuse to treat Medicaid and even Medicare patients. 24   Each 
program can be complex and intimidating to beneficiaries.  As 
Medicaid costs continue to rise, federal and state budget cuts are 
leaving many vulnerable citizens outside the health care system 
altogether. 25   Both programs’ expenditures are increasingly 
scrutinized by auditors eager to penalize overbilling, fraud, and 
abuse of the system.26  Though necessary, fraud and abuse law 
has grown so complex that it is becoming a trap for the unwary. 27
These laws may chill not only fraud, but also aggressive care that 
risks being deemed excessive or abusive in the current legal 
climate.28
23
 Thomas Bodenheimer & Keven Grumbach, Paying for Health 
Care, 272 JAMA 634 (1994) (quoted in HALL, BOBINSKI, AND 
ORENTLICHER, THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND 
REGULATION 167 (2005)). 
24 See William Buczo, Provider Opt-out Under Medicare Private 
Contracting, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Winter 2004-2005, at 43.  
25
  John Jacobi, Dangerous Times for Medicaid, Seton Hall Public 
Law Research Paper No. 45, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=845084 (last visited Feb. 25, 2006) (Many 
Medicaid reforms proposed in 2005 “would lessen our commitment to 
care for the poor and disabled, in some cases pushing vulnerable people 
out of public coverage.”).  
26 See, e.g., ALICE G. GOSFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 
FRAUD AND ABUSE (2005) (a 606 page guide on the topic).   
27
 James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an 
Evolving Health Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 
22 AM. J. L. & MED. 205 (1996) (arguing that the vagueness and 
breadth of these statutes grant “enormous prosecutorial discretion, 
which is subject to abuse.”).
28 See Jeremy Fine Bollinger, Doctoring Fraud & Abuse: 
Enforcement of the Stark and Anti-Kickback Law in Physician 
Recruitment May be Bad for Your Health, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 485, 
513 n. 158 (2004) (discussing perverse incentives created by Medicare 
fraud and abuse laws).
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Meanwhile, patients are demanding more care and less 
restrictions on their choice of procedures and providers.  
Although managed care plans have begun to meet this demand by 
offering subscribers PPO plans and other more flexible options, 
survey evidence reveals dissatisfaction with the health care 
system as a whole:
In a nationwide survey of more than 2,000 adults 
published last fall, 55 percent of those surveyed said 
they were dissatisfied with the quality of health 
care, up from 44 percent in 2000; and 40 percent 
said the quality of care had gotten worse in the last 
five years.29
Patients have even begun to question the utility of hard-won 
gains in autonomy, such as increased ability to choose treatment 
options.30  Opaque and even perverse rationing mechanisms for 
care ranging from vaccinations to hospitalization have raised 
resentment and concern.31
29
 Benedict Carey, In the Hospital, a Degrading Shift from Person 
to Patient, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2005, at A1.  The survey was 
conducted by Harvard University, the federal Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality and the Kaiser Family Foundation, an 
independent nonprofit health care research group.  Id. 
30 See, e.g., BARRY SCHWARTZ, PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY 
MORE IS LESS 32-33 (2004) (“When it comes to medical treatment, 
patients see choice as both a blessing and a burden. . . . [T]he prospect 
of a medical decision has become everyone’s worst nightmare of a term 
paper assignment, with stakes infinitely higher than a grade in a 
course.”); Jan Harris, Awash in Information, Patients Face a Lonely, 
Uncertain Road, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005 (“Dr. Russo, [a] West 
Orange, N.J., internist who sees 5,000 patients a year, applauds patients 
who do their homework. But, he noted, especially when patients are 
researching treatment options, they flop down in his office, feeling 
inundated.”).  
31 See, e.g., Mark V. Pauly, Improving Vaccine Supply and 
Development, 24(3) HEALTH AFFAIRS 680 (2005) (describing federal 
government’s repeated recent failures to properly stock and distribute 
flu vaccine); Benedict Carey, In the Hospital, a Degrading Shift from 
Person to Patient, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2005, at A1 (noting rising 
Retainer Care
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Payors’ pressure for cost containment has also riled 
patients.  Worried by increasingly harried or unresponsive 
doctors, they are demanding change.  Insurance plans have begun 
to oblige some of these demands.  Wary of constantly being cast 
as the heavy in the drama of health care cost containment, 
managed care organizations have begun incentivizing cost 
consciousness instead of imposing strict command and control-
style restrictions on coverage.32  Cost-sharing, preferred provider 
options, and other strategies have emerged in order to widen the 
scope of treatments and personnel available to insureds.
Of course, these new options have a price, and they are 
only available to those who pay for them.33  Insurers are “tiering” 
their offerings, providing consumers with more control over the 
range of services they can demand and the depth of coverage they 
desire.  One of the most important ways of financing new 
coverage options for consumers is “segmentation of services 
through financial incentives.”34  In exchange for greater choice, 
consumers bear more financial risk in two complementary ways: 
[H]orizontal segmentation, in which consumers are 
induced to choose the richness of coverage based on 
levels of patient dissatisfaction with hospital visits and unclear 
admittance criteria).
32 Henry Greely, Direct Financial Incentives in Managed Care: 
Unanswered Questions, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 53 (1996); Mark Hall, 
Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health 
Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (1988) [hereinafter 
Hall, Institutional Control]; Mark Hall, Rationing Health Care at the 
Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1995); David Orentlicher, Paying 
Physicians More To Do Less: Financial Incentives To Limit Care, 30 
U. RICH. L. REV. 155 (1996); Andrea K. Marsh, Sacrificing Patients 
For Profits: Physician Incentives To Limit Care And Erisa Fiduciary 
Duty, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1323, 1342 (1999).
33 Special Issue: The Managed Care Backlash, 24 J. HEALTH POL., 
POL’CY & L. 873 (1999).
34
 John V. Jacobi, After Managed Care: Gray Boxes, Tiers and 
Consumerism, 47 ST. LOUIS L.J. 397, 403 (2003) (citing James C. 
Robinson, Web Exclusive, Renewed Emphasis on Consumer Cost 
Sharing in Health Insurance Benefit Design, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 20, 
2002, at W139, W140, at
http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/2103Robinson.pdf.).
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variable employee cost share, and vertical 
segmentation, in which consumers within plans are 
induced to choose providers based on variable 
employee cost share.35
Each type of segmentation is designed to encourage cost-
consciousness among “consumers” of health care, while opening 
up new vistas of care options for those able to pay for them.  
Insureds act as partners with the plan in calibrating more precise 
trade-offs of cost and quality.36
This growing trend toward “consumer choice” in health 
care raises the stakes of retainer medicine regulation.37  To the 
extent retainer practices avoid serious regulatory scrutiny, they 
will likely encourage innovators who want to make health 
insurance more a defined contribution than a defined benefit 
system.  So far, consumer driven health plans, health savings 
accounts, and cash-only practices have not become widespread.  
However, Congressional and wonkish enthusiasm for these plans 
remains high, as evidenced by recent incentives for HSA’s 
embedded in the Medicare Modernization and Prescription Drug 
Act of 2003.38  Whether by design or incidentally, health savings 
accounts will be a great boon to the development of cash-only 
practices that evade managed care strictures. 39   All these 
developments create fertile ground for entrepreneurs seeking 
compensation for levels of care they deem necessary or desirable 
for patients.
35 Id. at  403
36 Id. (“As the rate of differential and the number of tiers increases, 
co-payments and co-insurance seem less a gentle nudge to conform to 
the plan's network design than a mechanism to pass through discounts 
arranged between the plan and providers.”).
37 REGINA HERZLINGER, CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND POLICY-MAKERS 10
(2004) (documenting trend toward consumer choice in health care).
38 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201, 117 Stat. 2469 (2003).
39
 Rhonda L. Rundle, Pay-as-you-go M.D.: The Doctor is In, But 
Insurance is Out, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2002, at A1 (describing 
advantages of cash-only practices).
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B. Physician and Patient Experiences with Retainer Care
The trends toward tiered insurance plans and cash-only 
practices and converge in retainer care or concierge medicine, 
which offers patients the chance to contract directly with 
physicians for services not covered by insurance plans.40  The 
services are diverse; they range from “same or next-day 
appointments” to “private waiting rooms.” 41   The fees for 
concierge care also vary widely, depending on the reputation of 
the doctors involved and the level of care received.  A “top-of-
the-line” practice, which accepts no insurance payments, may 
40
 Retainer care, concierge medicine, and boutique medicine all 
designate the same phenomenon.  When it mandated a study on the 
topic in 2003, Congress defined concierge care as
an arrangement under which, as a prerequisite for the 
provision of a health care item or service to an 
individual, a physician, practitioner . . . or other 
individual--
(A) charges a membership fee or another 
incidental fee to an individual desiring to 
receive the health care item or service from 
such physician, practitioner, or other 
individual; or 
(B) requires the individual desiring to 
receive the health care item or service from 
such physician, practitioner, or other 
individual to purchase an item or service. 
42 U.S.C.A. 1395cc (2004).  Jennifer Russano provides a good 
narrative account of various retainer-financed practices.  See Russano, 
Is Boutique Medicine a New Threat to American Healthcare or a 
Logical Way of Revitalizing the Doctor-Patient Relationship?, 17 J. 
LAW & POL’Y 313, 322 (2005).
41
 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. The GAO concedes that this 
survey is not necessarily representative; however, over half the sample 
responded.  See also Abigail Zuger, Before You Die, Determine What 
You’re Paying For, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at 26 (“According to 
[concierge patient] Dorothy Lipson, resident of Del Ray Beach, 
Florida, the niceties can make all the difference . . . all appointments, 
tests, and treatments were coordinated by the concierge practice”).
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cost $20,000 per patient per year; more modest services may only 
cost several hundred dollars annually.42
Though a small “cash-only” movement has been opting 
out of the managed care system since its inception, retainer 
medicine only emerged in the mid-1990’s in Seattle.43  Since 
then, it has spread to a number of (mostly urban) areas.44  Though 
“top-of-the-line” retainer practices offer extraordinary amenities, 
they also tend not to take insurance or to require clients to file 
their own insurance claims.45  However, the majority of retainer 
practices depend on both retainer payments and insurance 
reimbursement.46  They market more modest services: preventive 
42
 Of the practices surveyed by the GAO, “the amount of the 
concierge care membership fee ranged from $60 to $15,000 a year for 
an individual, with about half of respondents charging individual 
annual membership fees of $1,500 to $1,999.”  GAO REPORT, supra 
note 1, at 4.  Note that the fees follow a classic bell-curve distribution, 
rather than a bimodal distribution that would be expected if practices 
were concentrated as high and low-end types.  Id., at 13. 
43
 Gregory M. Lamb, Gold-Card Health Care: Is It Boon Or 
Bane?, CHRIST. SCI. MON., May 17, 2004, at 12.  Dr. John Blanchard, 
president and cofounder of the American Society of Concierge 
physicians, has stated:
The current model of healthcare delivery, particularly 
in the primary-care setting, is dysfunctional, to say the 
least.  You’re shuttled through offices like cattle.  This 
is not the way healthcare was designed.  The quality of 
healthcare is based largely on the integrity of the 
patient-physician relationship – and that relationship 
breaks down in a high-volume healthcare setting.
Id.
44 See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at Appendix B (providing 
geographical depiction of retainer care prevalence).
45 See G. Caleb Alexander, Jacob Kurlander, and Matthew K. 
Wynia, Physicians in Retainer ("Concierge") Practice: A National 
Survey of Physician, Patient, and Practice Characteristics, 20(12) J. 
GEN. INTERN. MED. 1079, 1082 (2005).
46 See Concierge Family Medicine Practice, Every Patient is a VIP 
to Us,   http://www.conciergefamilymedicine.com (conventional health 
insurance is still recommended by cash-only practices in order to cover 
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care, comprehensive physicals, helpful staff and coordination of 
care, and guaranteed attention from a dedicated physician within 
twenty-four hours of a request for care. 47
The divergence between high- and low-end practices is a 
difference not only of degree, but also (at least for the law) of 
kind.  By opting out of the insurance system altogether, the high-
end practices are purchasing a great deal of autonomy.  However, 
they also run the risk of being classified as insurers themselves, 
provoking the whole gamut of state regulation that such 
classification entails.48  Lower-end practices can avoid that risk 
by focusing on insured patients.  However, they risk running 
afoul of Medicare regulations prohibiting balance billing or false 
claims, or of insurance contracts that condition reimbursements 
on similar strictures.49  Part IV below deals with these concerns 
in more detail.
Retainer medicine has provoked controversy in part 
because of the abrupt transition many practices have made to it.  
Steven Flier’s story is typical.  Disgruntled by time pressure, 
falling reimbursement rates, and insurers’ interference with 
treatment options, Dr. Flier and his partners transitioned their 
practice into Personal Physicians HealthCare in 2000.  They cut 
their panels by two -thirds or more, each offering a very high level 
of primary and preventive care to the first 300 patients willing to 
pay a $4,000 annual fee.  Patients unable to pay the retainer fee 
were understandably perturbed, and widespread media coverage 
followed.50  A similar dynamic has played out in many cities.  
out-of office expenses such as hospitalization, emergency-room visits, 
and diagnostic tests).
47
 “Dedicated” in the sense of “your personal physician,” not 
merely “loyal” or “devoted.”  
48 See discussion in Part VI.A. below; see also Carol M. Ostrom, 
Concierge Physicians Medical Model Growing, SEATTLE TIMES, May 
28, 2004, at B1.
49 See, e.g., Dukakis v. Massachusetts Medical Society, 815 F.2d 
790 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding Medicare’s “reasonable charge” 
requirements constitutional).
50 A recent news report on retainer care gives examples of 
physicians who permit “volunteer work” or who “grandfather in” extant 
patients who really want to stay with their practices.  Amy Zipkin, The 
Concierge Doctor Is Available (at a Price), supra note 50, at A6. 
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The American Medical Association has closely followed 
the boutique medicine trend and guardedly endorsed physicians’ 
right to convert to retainer practices.51  The AMA conducted a 
survey of both concierge- and non-concierge-funded physicians 
in order to better understand the practice’s appeal to some of its 
members. 52  According to this survey, “50% of the retainer 
physicians said they thought they were offering more diagnostic 
and therapeutic services than traditional practices,” and “70% of 
retainer physicians said they were doing better [financially] in 
this type of practice than they had in traditional practice.”53  It’s 
not hard to see why, given the numbers: “Retainer physicians saw 
an average of 11 patients per day; nonretainer physicians saw an 
average of 22 patients.” 54    As the GAO report notes, these 
patients’ retainer payments in excess of insurance 
reimbursements average between $1,500 and $2,000 per year.  
About the only downsides for doctors mentioned in the 
AMA survey and GAO report are the disapproval of colleagues 
51
 The CMS report is more positive than the CJEA report, but 
neither condemn retainer care.  Compare Council on Ethical and 
Judical Affairs, Report of the Council on Ethical and Judical Affairs: 
Retainer Practices (2003), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_3a03.pdf with Council on 
Medical Services, Report of the Council on Medical Services, available 
at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/372/cms902.doc
(CMS REP. NO. 9-A-02 (2002)).
52
 Jennifer Silverman, Retainer practices reporting better care, 
FAMILY PRACTICE NEWS, June 1, 2005, at 71. (reporting that “the 
AMA mailed out surveys to 144 physicians from retainer practices--
also known as concierge or boutique medicine practices--and received 
83 responses. As a control group, researchers mailed surveys to 463 
primary care physicians in non-retainer practices from the AMA's 
master list, and received 231 responses. Data were collected between 
December 2003 and February 2004.”)  The primary source data have 
not yet been released; they are “still unpublished and have been in 
review since January 2005.”  Id.
53 Id.  The only apparent downsides were legal worries and 
reputational concerns. See Silverman, Retainer practices reporting 
better care, supra note 52, at 72 (“When queried about the potential 
risks of a retainer practice, respondents from both groups expressed 
concern that society and their peers would disapprove of their decision 
to start a retainer practice.”).
54 Id.
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and the legal uncertainty surrounding this new method of health 
care finance.55  Many of the physicians surveyed by the AMA 
were concerned about societal and collegial condemnation of 
boutique care.56  The GAO reports repeated pleas from doctors 
for guidance from HHS on the legality of their practice, or a list 
of “safe harbor” practices that will not provoke regulators’ 
scrutiny.57  Scholars of law and norms would likely be quick to 
note the mutually reinforcing character of these concerns. 58
Widespread disapproval of concierge practices may rest on the 
conflation of a legal with a normative definition of good medical 
practice, while regulators themselves have likely gotten involved 
because of the concerns raised by doctors themselves and the 
more progressive medical associations.   If either legal or 
normative concerns quickly clear up, retainer care could spread 
much more quickly than it has since its inception.
Neither the GAO nor the AMA surveyed the patients of 
concierge practices.59  Perhaps their names were unavailable or 
55 Id.
56 See Silverman, Retainer practices reporting better care, supra
note 52, at 74 (“‘You risk having people look down their noses at you,’ 
Dr. Wynia said. In a surprising statistic, ‘5% of people in retainer 
practices thought they should be discouraged’ from pursuing this 
approach.’   Indeed, several participants at the meeting told this 
newspaper that their employer or practice partners did not know that 
they were attending a conference on concierge care.  More than half of 
retainer physicians and 80% of nonretainer physicians thought that 
concierge care created a risk of a more tiered system of access to health 
care.  Loss of patient diversity and insurance contracts and legal 
challenges were other concerns cited by the survey respondents.”)
57 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
58 See, e.g., Kristin Madison, Government, Signaling, and Social 
Norms, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 867, 880 (2001) (discussing how 
normative order serves as an extralegal mechanism for influencing 
behavior).
59
 However, another study did focus on the demographic mix of 
patients at concierge practices.  According to a recent survey, “Retainer 
physicians . . . reported caring for few patients on Medicaid compared 
to nonretainer physicians . . . [and] minority patients were also under-
represented in most of these practices.”  G. Caleb Alexander, Jacob 
Kurlander, and Matthew K. Wynia, Physicians in Retainer 
("Concierge") Practice: A National Survey of Physician, Patient, and 
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retainer physicians were unwilling to encourage scrutiny of a 
delicate new financing arrangement.  There are essentially two 
views of patient experiences.  Skeptics charge that these health 
care consumers are merely buying the appearance of better care, 
without any objective contribution to their health.  Proponents of 
concierge care tend to view market demand as revelation and 
proof of the value of the service.60   There is some empirical 
evidence for the claim; according to one reporter, “patients 
buying these higher levels of personal care have been renewing 
on a better-than-90-percent annual basis in many practices.”61
Of course, there’s no such thing as a free lunch—where 
do the patients unable or unwilling to afford the retainer care 
premium go?  Hundreds of panelists are often dropped by a 
practice in its transition to the retainer model.  Both the AMA 
and the GAO report that nearly all of these individuals are 
“absorbed into nearby practices,” particularly because retainer 
care is now only prevalent in urban areas where there are plenty 
of doctors.62  Despite these assurances, concerns about consumer 
protection, access to care, and public insurance budgets have led 
to increasing regulatory and journalistic scrutiny of boutique 
practices.
III. CONTROVERSY OVER FEDERAL REGULATION
State and federal policymakers are slowly beginning to 
realize the potentially corrosive distributive impact of boutique 
medicine.63  The federal Medicare program is the most important 
Practice Characteristics, 20(12) J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 1079, 1083 
(2005) [hereinafter National Survey].  
60 Advocates say ‘concierge medicine’ is like having the 
neighborhood doctor back; critics call it elitist, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 1, 
2005, at B6.
61
 Russ Allen, Doctors on Retainer Catch On, RISK & INSURANCE, 
Mar. 1, 2005, at 21.
62 See CMS REPORT, supra note 51, at 3; GAO REPORT, supra
note 1, at 14.
63
 Carol M. Ostrom, Retainer Fees’ Spark Warning, supra note 48, 
at B1; Sandi Doughton, State Looks Askance at Extra Fees for Doctors, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at B1; Howard Gleckman, Want a 
Doctor Who Treats You Like Royalty?, BUS. WKLY., May 6, 2002; 
Uwe E. Reinhardt, Doctors Are More Interested in Having Higher 
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factor here, as it has construed the concierge care retainer as a 
charge to patients beyond the normal rate in at least one case.64
Sections A and B below describe extant efforts to regulate 
concierge care.  Federal regulation currently has the perverse 
incentive of inducing physicians’ to bundle retainer care with 
amenities, in order to characterize the retainer as a charge for 
amenities, rather than a second charge for covered services 
Medicare already paid for.  Unfortunately, the very double-billing 
rules designed to enhance access to medical care in the 1980s are 
now actually encouraging tiering in the service of their evasion.
A. An Ambiguous Federal Stance
Many members of Congress have claimed that retainer 
billing practices are crude evasions of balance billing rules.65
According to these legislators and some consumer advocates, 
retainer practices violate the balance billing rules by effectively 
getting paid twice for the same service.66  The basic contention 
here is that Medicare beneficiaries with retainer plans are not 
only being charged the normal fee for services (which is basically 
limited, and paid for, by Medicare), but are also being charged 
whatever fraction of their annual concierge care fees can be 
reasonably allocated to the service.  For example, consider a 
Incomes than Providing Better Health Care, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 1335 
(2002).
64
 “Concierge practices say they adhere to the law by ensuring that 
their fees pay only for services not covered by insurance or Medicare.”  
Pam Belluck, Doctors’ New Practices Offer Deluxe Service for Deluxe 
Fee, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2002, at A1; see also. Editorial, Boutique 
Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, A28.  Critics believe this may be 
evasion (and not mere avoidance) of balance billing rules.
65
 Letter from Representative Henry Waxman to Tommy 
Thompson, Secretary of Human Health Services, Mar. 4, 2002, at 2, on 
file with author.  (“In 1989, as part of the OBRA [Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act], Congress legislated that “[n]o person may bill or 
collect an actual charge for the [Medicare] service in excess of the 
limiting charge.”  This “limiting charge” now stands at 115% of the 
Medicare rate.  By conditioning the receipt of all Medicare services on
an annual fee, however, “exclusive” physician practices seem to violate 
this law.”).
66
 Id.
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hypothetical retainer patient with Medicare who visits her 
physician 5 times a year and pays a retainer fee of $3,000 
annually.  If Medicare sets a $200 reimbursement limit, which the 
physician collects, it appears that the patient is not simply being 
billed for that $200, but also for $600 additionally for each visit 
(with an amount of the retainer proportionally applied to each 
visits).67
Conditions on Medicare funding provide important 
leverage for the federal government to influence the American 
health care system. 68   Participating providers must follow a 
complex set of rules for reimbursement. 69 Over 70% of 
concierge physicians contacted by the GAO participate in 
Medicare, so the program provides some leverage over the 
development of retainer care.  Medicare regulation may also 
provide a model for large private insurers to assure that they are 
not subsidizing the tiering of the health care system.70
Though HHS’s response to critics of retainer care was 
initially skeptical,71 HHS officials have issued some warnings to 
67
 Paul Ginsburg, president of the Center for Studying Health 
System Change, has claimed that this strategy is “the equivalent of an 
end run around Medicare rules.”  Michael Romano and Laura B. 
Benko, These doctors and their affluent patients find themselves in 
exclusive company, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Oct. 22, 2001, at 38.
68 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS 
& PROBLEM 736 (4th ed., 2001).
69 Id.
70
 According to one journalist, “Private insurers, which often 
follow Medicare's lead, may also join the fray. Anthem Blue Cross 
Blue Shield has barred Virginia doctors from soliciting or accepting 
additional payments from patients insured by the company.  Most 
insurers in the state say they're waiting to see if the insurance 
commissioner comes up with new rules.” Carol M. Ostrom, Retainer 
Fees' Spark Warning, supra note 48, at B1.
71
 Thompson letter to Waxman, et al., supra note 65, at 4 
(accepting concierge physicians’ assertion that the retainer payments 
only compensated for noncovered services).  Thompson has since left 
the Department of Health and Human Services, and has become the 
chairman of MDVIP’s “Committee on Cost Reduction Through 
Preventive Health Care.”  See MDVIP, Press Release, at 
http://mdvip.com/pressReleaseThompson.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).  
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providers about potential violations of the law. 72 The Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) and the Office of the 
Inspector General (“OIG”) of HHS are currently developing a 
regulatory response designed to protect the interests of Medicare 
beneficiaries.  
CMS outlined its position on concierge care in a 
March 2002 memorandum to CMS regional offices 
that CMS officials told us remains current as of 
June 2005. The memorandum states that physicians 
may enter into retainer agreements with their 
patients as long as these agreements do not violate 
any Medicare requirements.  For example, 
concierge care membership fees may constitute 
prohibited additional charges if they are for 
Medicare-covered items or services. If so, a 
physician who has not opted out of Medicare would 
be in violation of the limits on what she or he may 
charge patients who are Medicare beneficiaries.73
The “additional charges” mentioned are prohibited by “balance 
billing rules,” which prevent doctors from charging an amount 
72
 Carol M. Ostrom, Retainer Fees Spark Warning, supra note 48, 
at B8. “The federal government is warning physicians they could face 
penalties or even expulsion from Medicare if they charge those patients 
for covered services.  What are these services? Medicare's fraud alert 
isn't spelling it out, but a Minneapolis doctor was busted for charging a 
fee for services such as "coordination of care" and "extra time" with 
patients.  ‘Medicare beneficiaries are entitled to certain services from 
their physician,’ said Greg Demske, a chief in the Office of the 
Inspector General. If the physicians are asking for extra money for 
those services, then that's a problem.’”) 
73
 Robert M. Portman, Back to The Future of Medicine, supra note 
2, at 12.  (“The Medicare statute requires physicians to submit claims 
for all procedures performed on Medicare patients, even if they do not 
accept assignment. It also prohibits physicians who accept assignment 
of a patient's claim from charging more than the Medicare fee schedule 
amount. Those who do not accept assignment are prohibited from 
charging more than 115% of the fee schedule amount.”).
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above Medicare care limits, getting reimbursement from 
Medicare, and then charging patients for the balance remaining.74
The balance billing rules arose out of Congressional 
concern about potential barriers to access to care for poor and 
lower middle class Medicare beneficiaries.75  Without such rules, 
physicians could condition services to Medicare patients on the 
payment of additional charges that would undermine the 
programs’ efforts to provide reasonably-priced health care to all.  
Under Medicare balance billing rules, participating 
physicians’ charges are limited by the fee schedule prescribed by 
the program. 76     Under the relevant statute, physicians who 
accept assigned claims are prohibited “from charging more than 
the Medicare fee schedule amount.”77  Physicians who “do not 
accept assignment are prohibited from charging more than 115% 
of the fee schedule amount.”78
74
 Markian Hawryluk, Boutique Medicine May Run Afoul of 
Medicare Rules, supra note 18 (citing 42 U.S.C. §  1395w-4(g)(2)(C) 
(2000)); see also Jennifer Russano, Is Boutique Medicine a New 
Threat, supra note 41, at 322.
75
 “Recognizing that many of the poor could not afford to pay 
medical bills, the original Medicare and Medicaid legislation prohibited 
physicians from balance billing those Medicare beneficiaries who were 
also eligible to receive Medicaid benefits. For all others, however, 
Medicare allowed physicians to bill more than the Medicare payment 
for services on a claim-by-claim basis until 1983.  Since 1983, 
physicians have been given the choice to participate or not to 
participate under the Participating Provider (PAR) Program, for which 
they are given several incentives to enroll.”  David C. Colby, Thomas 
Rice, Jill Bernstein, and Lyle Nelson, Balance Billing Under Medicare: 
Protecting Beneficiaries and Preserving Physician Participation, 20 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 49, 51 (1995).  
76 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(g)(2) (2005); Robert M. Portman, 
Concierge Care: Back to The Future of Medicine, supra note 2, at 12.  
(“The Medicare statute requires physicians to submit claims for all 
procedures performed on Medicare patients, even if they do not accept 
assignment. It also prohibits physicians who accept assignment of a 
patient's claim from charging more than the Medicare fee schedule 
amount. Those who do not accept assignment are prohibited from 
charging more than 115% of the fee schedule amount.”).
77 Id. at 4.
78 Id.  
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To the extent that they implicate balanced billing 
concerns, retainer practices could also violate the False Claims 
Act.79  The Congressional sponsors of legislation to keep retainer 
care practitioners out of the federal Medicare system claim that 
these physicians “routinely submit erroneous bills to the 
government.”80    To return to the hypothetical scenario above, 
they insist that the bill for each visit of the retainer care patient is 
actually $700, not $200, and that its representation to the 
government as the latter is merely a fiction designed to avoid the 
strictures of balance billing rules.81  Retainer care proponents’ 
79According to the False Claims Act, 
Any person who—
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an 
officer or employee of the United States Government . . .  
a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, 
a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent 
claim paid or approved by the Government
***
is liable to the United States Government for a civil 
penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, 
plus three times the amount of damages which the 
Government sustains because of the act of that person
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2005).  Critics of retainer care characterize the bill to 
the government as a “false claim” that has already been paid for by the 
retainer.  See Waxman Letter, supra note 65, at 4.
80
 Waxman Letter, supra note 65, at 4.
81
 “OIG [the Office of the Inspector General at the Department of 
Health and Human Services] has addressed the consequences of 
noncompliance with Medicare billing requirements. In March 2004, 
HHS OIG issued an alert ‘to remind Medicare participating physicians 
of the potential liabilities posed by billing Medicare patients for 
services that are already covered by Medicare.’  GAO REPORT, supra
note 1 at 27.  The alert stated that “charging extra fees for already 
covered services abuses the trust of Medicare patients by making them 
pay again for services already paid for by Medicare.”  Id.  As an 
example, the alert referred to a Minnesota physician who paid a 
settlement and agreed to stop offering personal health care contracts to 
patients for annual fees of $600.”  Id.
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response to this accusation closely tracks their line on the balance 
billing rules.  They claim that the services they offer are not 
covered by Medicare, so they are not properly billed as Medicare 
claims.82
B. Covered or Noncovered Services?
A leading retainer care trade association claims that the 
retainer is a payment for “better service, not better medical 
care.” 83   This characterization is important, because “‘If 
participating physicians decide they want to charge patients 
additional fees they should be mindful that they are subject to 
civil money penalties if they request any payment for already 
covered services from Medicare patients other than the 
applicable deductible and coinsurance.’” 84   Medicare covered 
services include all “items and services . . . reasonable and 
necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to 
improve the functioning of a malformed body member.”85
82
 Society for Innovative Medical Practice Design, Report to the 
General Accounting Office, Aug. 2004, at 15. (copy on file with 
author).
83
 Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson 
Letter,  supra note 65, at 2; Robert M. Portman, Concierge Care: Back 
to the Future of Medicine, supra note 2, at 5.  
84
 Acting Principal Deputy Inspector General Dara Corrigan, 
Office of the Inspector General Alerts Physicians About Added 
Charges for Covered Services, OIG ALERT, at  
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/2004/FA033104
AssignViolationI.pdf [hereinafter Corrigan Memorandum] (implying 
that the concierge amenities at issue fall outside the scope of “Medicare 
covered services” and thus should not be subject to “balance billing” 
scrutiny.).
8542 U.S.C. § 1395y (2005).  There are of course a long list of 
exceptions, codified in subparagraphs appearing after this portion of the 
stature.  Most important for our purposes are the many preventive 
services that Medicare is now covering, including “prostate cancer 
screening; bone mass density measurement; diabetic self-management; 
mammography screening; glaucoma screening; pap smears; an initial 
physical examination; cardiovascular screening blood tests; diabetes 
screening tests; and hepatitis B, pneumococcal, and flu shots.”  
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The distinction between covered and noncovered services 
is a term of art of federal health care financing.  Medicare tends 
to follow the diagnosis and management codes developed by the 
American Medical Association. 86   Unfortunately, neither 
regulations nor guidance documents appear to clarify application 
of this legal distinction to retainer care. 87   However, close 
examination of the lists of services offered by concierge practices 
discloses that at least some of them are likely covered Medicare 
services, as HHS itself determined in at least one case in 
Minnesota.88  In that case, the OIG provided three examples of 
potentially covered services illicitly charged for by a concierge 
physician: “coordination of care with providers, a comprehensive 
assessment and plan for optimum health, and extra time spent on 
patient care.”89  Unfortunately, the alert did not specify whether 
FURROW, ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 68, at 736 (citing 42 U.S.C.  
§ 1395y(a)(1)(A)).
86
 The statute establishes a substantive legal standard for Medicare 
coverage. 42 U.S.C. 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2000).  There are also regulatory 
criteria for National Coverage Determinations.  65 Fed. Reg. 31124 
(May 16, 2000) (citing 42 USC 1395y(a)(1)(A) for authority to avoid 
coverage of services "not reasonable and necessary."). 
87
 Joan R. Rose, A Caution Light for Concierge Practices, 81(10) 
MED. ECON. 22 (May 21, 2004).  Each “improper request” to a patient 
for payment can result in a $10,000 fine, plus treble damages.  Carol M. 
Ostrom, Retainer fees spark warning, supra note 48, at B1.
88 Corrigan Memorandum, supra note 84, at 1-2 ((“For example, 
the OIG recently alleged that a physician violated his assignment 
agreement when he presented to his patients--including Medicare 
beneficiaries – a ‘Personal Health Care Medical Care Contract’ asking 
patients to pay an annual fee of $600. While the physician 
characterized the services to be provided under the contract as ‘not 
covered’  by Medicare, the OIG [Office of the Inspector General] 
alleged that at least some of these contracted services were already 
covered and reimbursable by Medicare.  Among other services offered 
under this contract were the ‘coordination of care with other providers,’ 
‘a comprehensive assessment and plan for optimum health,’ and ‘extra 
time’ spent on patient care. OIG alleged that based on the specific facts 
and circumstances of this case, at least some of these contracted 
services were already covered and reimbursable by Medicare.”).
89 Id.
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only one, or all, of these services was (or were) covered under 
Medicare.90
In the case of the third or so concierge practices with 
retainer fees below $1,000 per year, it is perhaps believable that 
patients would be willing to pay such a fee for more courteous 
staff, a nicer waiting room, monogrammed slippers, and other 
non-care-related amenities.91  However, as fees mount, such a 
sharp distinction between care and customer service is harder to 
defend.92
IV. RESOLVING THE BALANCE BILLING CONTROVERSY BY 
DISAGGREGATING RETAINER CARE
In order to resolve the controversy over whether retainers 
are prohibited payments for covered services, or permitted 
payments for noncovered services, it is important to disaggregate 
the range of services provided by retainer care physicians.  
90 Id.; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.  GAO could not 
get clarification despite interviewing the relevant personnel at HHS.  
Id.  (“HHS OIG did not indicate which, if any, of those three services 
were already covered by Medicare. The resulting uncertainty, about 
which features of the Minnesota physician’s concierge agreement 
formed the basis for HHS OIG’s allegation that he violated the 
Medicare program’s prohibition against charging beneficiaries more 
than the applicable deductible and coinsurance, generated concern 
among some concierge physicians.”) 
91 See also Jennifer Russano, Is Boutique Medicine a New Threat 
to Access?, supra note 41, at 336. (“If boutique medical practices 
provide their patients with bonuses such as heated towel racks, free 
hotel rooms, [and] special bathrobes, these amenities could violate the 
federal anti-kickback statute or the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act prohibiting such inducements.  However, since 
these amenities are offered after payment of a retainer, it is likely that 
they will be seen as services provided in exchange for payment and not 
as an ‘inducement.’”).
92
 As the GAO Report notes, “Critics believe that the benefit plans 
generally do not exclude coverage for the specific sets of medical 
services that the physicians offering retainer contracts say they will 
deliver, but rather, cover costs of medically necessary or appropriate 
services.”  GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
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Section A below develops a taxonomy, while Section B applies 
that categorization to the legal issues at hand.
A. Three Faces of Retainer Care
Retainer care physicians offer a wide range of services, as 
this survey from the Government Accountability Office shows: 
Features Offered by Concierge Physicians, October 200493
Feature % offering 
feature
Same- or next-day appointments for nonurgent 
care
99
24-hour telephone access 99
Periodic preventive-care physical examination 99
Extended office visits 96
Access to physician via e-mail 94
Access to physician via cell phone or pager 93
Wellness planning 93
Nutrition planning 82
Coordination of medical needs during travel 82
Patient home or workplace consultations 78
Smoking cessation support 77
Preventive screening procedures 72
Newsletter 71
Stress reduction counseling 67
Private waiting room 63
Mental health counseling 60
Online or other electronic access to personal 
records
42
Though many commentators have directed praise or blame at 
retainer care as a whole, these statistics show that there are many 
distinct services offered by concierge physicians.  I believe they 
may be usefully categorized as
93
 From GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at Appendix A.  
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1. Preventive care (designed to prevent illness or 
moderate the effects of chronic illness); 
2. Queue-jumping (designed to grant privileged access to 
superior health care); and 
3. Amenity-bundling (designed to enhance the value of 
queue-jumping and preventive care by combining them 
with comforts, luxuries, and positive experiences).  
I describe each of these categories below.
1. Preventive Care
Nearly all retainer care practices responding to the GAO 
survey offer “periodic preventive-care physical examinations.”94
High percentages also offered “wellness planning” and “nutrition 
planning.”95  Concierge physicians are particularly proud of this 
dimension of their practice.  Bernard Kaminetsky, a concierge 
physician who has testified before Congress and been profiled in 
the New York Times, has frequently argued that his practice 
saves the health care system money by minimizing 
hospitalizations and emergency room visits via careful 
monitoring of patients and constant availability.96  He and other 
concierge physicians claim that, after years of feeling they could 
never meet their own high standards due to pressures from 
managed care, they can finally rest assured that they have 
94 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 (Of the concierge physicians 
responding to the survey, periodic preventive care, along with same or 
next-day appointments and 24-hour telephone access, were the most 
frequently reported features).
95
 93% offered wellness planning, and 82% offered nutrition 
planning.  Id.  Other practices report the following preventive 
measures: “smoking cessation support” (77%); “preventive screening 
procedures” (72%); “stress reduction counseling” (67%); and “mental 
health counseling” (60%).  Id.
96
 Bernard Kaminetsky, Testimony of Bernard Kaminetsky, M.D., 
before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, April 28, 2004, 
available at
http://jec.senate.gov/_files/KaminestskyTestimony04282004.pdf (only 
55% of recommended preventive care is administered, and only 52% of 
recommended screening, presumably leading to increased out-patient 
care and healthcare costs). 
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provided all potentially helpful primary medical care that their 
patients need.
Beyond any particular preventive intervention, the 
availability and constancy of retainer care also promises 
significant preventive effects.   A retainer physician can keep 
closer tabs on an array of potentially troublesome developments 
in a patient’s weight, habits, or bloodwork.  Advice on prevention 
from a trusted physician may also be far more effective than a 
rote catechism of self-care offered by a harried practitioner.  
Concierge care deserves to be encouraged to the extent 
that retainer payments fund the type of preventive health care that 
many public and private insurers have so far been unable or 
unwilling to fund.  Cancer screenings, vaccinations, cardiac 
rehabilitation, and anti-obesity and anti-smoking behavioral 
modification techniques undoubtedly occur at suboptimal rates.  
Many harried primary care physicians simply do not have the 
resources to provide them.  If some entrepreneurs among them 
can inspire patients to pay for these socially beneficial programs, 
regulatory agencies should not stand in their way. 
2. Queue-Jumping
Beyond preventive care, retainer care physicians also 
offer far quicker and lengthier access to ordinary care.  Nearly all 
of those responding to the GAO survey offer “same- or next-day 
appointments for nonurgent care,” “24-hour telephone access to 
physicians,” and “extended office visits.”97  Nearly as many offer 
access to physicians via e-mail, cell phones, or pagers.98  Many 
concierge physicians “coordinate medical needs during travel,” or 
visit their patients at their home or workplaces.99   A smaller 
number offer “priority for diagnostic medical tests in affiliated 
facilities.”100
Given most concierge physicians’ commitment to a 
“unitary standard of care,” such patients are not “skipping in 
front of” other patients within concierge practices.  However, 
97
 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 (Table 2).  These features are 
often reported as the most important features distinguishing concierge 
practices from more traditional primary-care practices.
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. (27%).
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they only attained this level of care by effectively outbidding 
those unable or unwilling to pay the required retainer.  Moreover, 
considering the baseline of primary care availability, they are far 
“ahead” of those in non-concierge practices.  The average 
American waits several days for an office visit, is subjected to 
more delays once at the doctor’s office, and more than half of 
such visits last less than 20 minutes.101   By contrast, concierge 
patients get near-immediate access, through both traditional 
visits, house-calls, and even e-consultations and phone calls.102
The term “queue-jumping” usually refers to individuals’ 
effort to spend their way past the “lines” for rationed care in 
order to get immediate attention.  The term has been most 
commonly used in analyses of “parallel” public and private 
health care systems, such as those prevailing in the United 
Kingdom, where the ten percent or so of the population that buys 
private insurance can use it to fund access to physicians whose 
attention they would normally need to wait weeks or months to 
get.103
Given that the overall mix of public and private spending 
in the United States has led to waits, on average, for primary 
care, there is a rather direct analogy between queue-jumping via 
concierge care in the U.S. and queue-jumping via private 
insurance or private payment in primarily public systems.  But to 
be analytically rigorous, it’s helpful to distinguish between 
jumping the queue to get rapid access and jumping ahead to 
more intense, lengthier, or more expert office visits.  The latter 
issues raise interesting problems, which might be developed by 
thinking about the extant, somewhat random, distribution of 
above-average primary care.  
Before concierge care, we may assume that some doctors 
were giving care as intense, expert, and dedicated as concierge 
physicians.  However, the distribution of such doctors was 
101
 Josh Fischman, Who Will Take Care of You? supra note 8, at 
46.    
102
 Bill Sonn, Concierge Medicine Physicians Weigh Financial, 
Ethical Issues, PHYSICIANS PRACTICE DIGEST, 2002, available at
http://www.shands.org/professional/ppd/practice_article.asp?ID=23.
103
 Michael Calnan, The NHS and Private Health Care, 10 
HEALTH MATRIX 3, 16 (2000) (discussing parallel public and private 
health systems in the United Kingdom).  
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somewhat random.  Perhaps some clung to an older standard of 
care, limiting their panels even as managed care squeezed 
effective compensation per patient.  Some were in rural areas 
where there just weren’t that many patients to treat.  Some were 
just exceptionally energetic.  Getting such a doctor was desirable, 
but left to chance and individual initiative, as people sought out 
recommendations of a “good” physician from family, friends, and 
coworkers.  The sick (and perhaps the worried well) could be 
counted on to expend real energy in finding an exceptional 
primary care physician; those needing less care would probably 
not find the effort worth their while. 
Admittedly, the informal “sorting” of doctors has always 
tracked class distinctions in the United States.  The better-off are 
more likely to have the time, connections, and skills necessary to 
find quality primary care.  Some of the best-off have long opted 
for “cash-only” practices, upon which the toniest retainer care 
practices have been modeled.  Retainer care promises to expand 
the scope of the commodification of primary care quality.  No 
longer do merely those wealthy enough to go “cash only” have 
the opportunity to command the attention of retainer doctors.  As 
the buying power of this class expands, the doctors most capable 
of taking advantage of it via retainer care are likely to be the best 
doctors, or at least those with a superior reputation.104  Retainer 
104
 Robert A. Berenson, Consumer-Directed Doctoring, Capital 
Hill Hearing Testimony to the House Joint Economic Committee, 
Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony (April 28, 
2004). 
[I]t is likely that relatively healthy, affluent individuals 
would be the group most likely to opt out of 
comprehensive insurance products, leading to high 
insurance costs for those whose health problems give 
them no choice but to remain in the basic health 
insurance pool.  As healthier families and individuals 
opt out of traditional insurance coverage, those 
remaining in comprehensive health plans would be 
more expensive to insure.  This will lead to destructive 
market segmentation, driving up premiums for 
traditional coverage even further and setting off a 
spiral of adverse selection.  The comprehensive health 
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patients are likely to want, not merely more time from a 
physician, but also quality time with a quality physician.  
These likely dynamics point to distinct facets of the 
“queue-jumping” so important to the retainer care model.  
Retainer payments guarantee a) quicker access to care—the 
classic definition of queue-jumping familiar from countries with 
parallel public and private systems.  But they also promise b) 
better health care, when they permit payors to leverage buying 
power into access to more skilled or dedicated physicians.  
Retainer patients are thus relatively advantaged (vis a vis 
nonretainer patients) by gaining quicker access to better care.
3. Amenity-Bundling
Yet just how far can retainer care physicians’ standard of 
care diverge from the normal standard?  Some commentators 
have been skeptical, pointing out that virtually any decent 
primary care practice will provide patients with a call service and 
quick attention (or a referral to a emergency room) in case of a 
serious problem.105  As mentioned above, several commentators 
suggest that current levels of dissatisfaction with managed care 
relate more to perception than reality.  Perhaps a great deal of the 
dissatisfaction stems from the near-automatic anxiety generated 
for many by today’s health care system.  For those already sick, 
the prospect of grappling with billing disputes and officious staff 
might be enough to keep them away from the doctor altogether.
As their moniker suggests, concierge physicians try to 
make the interactions with the health care system more like the 
lavish treatment at a fine hotel. Over half of those responding the 
GAO survey offered a “private waiting room.” 106   Thirty-one 
percent offered “home delivery of medication by physician or 
insurance option would become unaffordable precisely 
for those who need its protection.
Id.
105
 Robert M. Portman, Concierge Care: Back to the Future of 
Medicine, supra note 2, at 3.
106
 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 (63% of respondents claimed 
to offer this feature). 
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office staff.”107  Concierge practices generally pride themselves 
on making interactions between staff and patients as amenable 
and productive as possible.
Some sensationalistic media reports have also focused on 
the more extravagant “perks” of concierge patients: 
monogrammed bathrobes, heated towels, and slippers.  Although 
these reports probably don’t accurately represent the patient 
experiences at most concierge care practices, they suggest the 
direction of competition in the future.  Health care is often 
characterized by economists as an experience good--a service 
whose value is hard to judge critically until after it’s been 
rendered—or a credence good, whose value can really only be 
judged by experts.108  To the extent discriminating consumers 
want to compare concierge practices, they will often have little to 
go by other than the appearance of doctors’ offices and the perks 
they provide.
Would competition on amenities be a good development?  
There are several reasons to doubt that.   Amenity bundling, like 
many statutory and regulatory requirements for managed care 
coverage which stymie the provision of more “cut-rate” 
offerings, can be deeply inegalitarian.   Clark Havighurst’s 
critique of “managed care” mandates (which require health plans 
to cover procedures like in vitro fertilization) applies a fortiori to 
amenity bundling: 
107
 Admittedly, this is not a “luxury” for those unable to get to a 
pharmacist.  Unfortunately, the GAO survey does not reveal what 
percentage of retainer patients taking advantage of this service were not 
able to get to the doctor.
108
 William M. Sage and Peter J. Hammer, A Copernican View of 
Health Care Antitrust, 65-Fall LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 270 n. 
104 (2002) (“Many health care services are what economists call 
credence goods, meaning that consumers cannot necessarily assess their 
quality even after consuming them.”) (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, 
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. 
ECON. REV. 941, 951-52 (1963)).  With “credence goods, there exists 
an information asymmetry between buyers and sellers, leading to 
consumers never knowing the extent of goods that they actually need.”  
Winand Emons, Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts, available at
http://www.rje.org/abstracts/abstracts/1997/Spring_1997._pp._107_119
.html. 
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[T]he elite classes, including many self-
proclaimed consumer representatives as well as 
organized professional groups . . . design and 
maintain a system that meets their own particular 
needs but leaves less privileged citizens who are 
not qualified for publicly financed care with a 
Hobson's choice: either coverage for ‘Cadillac’ 
care or no health coverage at all.  Ruled as it is by 
and for dominant elites, the U.S. health care
system imposes large, unfair, and unnecessary 
economic burdens on ordinary working people.109
Scholars outside health law also raise concerns about amenities. 
As Lior Strahilevitz has demonstrated, “exclusionary amenities” 
are widely used by housing developers in order to discourage 
“unwanted” groups from affecting the character of the 
neighborhood, without running afoul of antidiscrimination 
laws.110 For example, a condominium association which only 
wants childless singles and couples to join may write into the 
relevant covenant a requirement that all residents subsidize a 
variety of amenities such families are unlikely to use. 111
Luxurious amenities may be valuable to those who can afford 
them, but also tend to increase already troubling trends toward 
economic apartheid.112 Though some may be inevitable in the 
housing market, health care should not be conditioned on one’s 
ability to purchase lavish services unrelated to therapeutic ends.  
The problem lies not only in the substance of amenity-
bundling, but also in its form.  Bundling has provoked antitrust 
109
 Clark Havighurst, How the Healthcare Revolution Fell Short
65 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 86 (2002).
110
 Lior Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential 
Communities (Univ. of Chicago, Law & Economics, Working Paper 
No. 250, 2005), at 2 (“People interested in residential homogeneity 
inevitably will try to thwart integration using creative substitutes for 
overt discrimination.”).
111
 Id., at 1.
112 CHUCK COLLINS AND FELICE YESKEL, ECONOMIC APARTHEID 
IN AMERICA 31 (2000) (discussing inequality and public health).
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scrutiny in certain industries.113  Since the rest of concierge care 
services often are not available outside a package including 
amenities, they are offered in a particularly tight type of 
bundling.114  Admittedly, it would be difficult to apply recent 
doctrine on “bundled discounts” to retainer practices given their 
lack of market power, and their failure to market the components 
of retainer care separately in the past.115  Yet perhaps the very 
difficulty of such an analysis suggests the need for valuing the 
component part of retainer care more carefully.116  As Section B 
below shows, often amenities are emphasized not simply for their 
own sake, but to provide “something else to bill for” to avoid 
liability for double billing for covered services.
113
 David S. Evans and Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle 
and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for 
Tying Law, 22 YALE J. REG. 37 (2005); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 3M’s 
Bundled Rebates: An Economic Perspective, U. CHI. L. REV. 243 
(2005) (discussing leading case 3M v. LePage’s.).
114
 Bruce H. Kobayashi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable 
Guide to Regulating Commodity Bundling by Firms?  A Survey of the 
Economic Literature, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 707, 708 n.2 
(2005) (charting six types of bundling, based on whether components 
are available separately or not).    
115
 Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 1688, 1689 (2005) (explaining that leading recent 
antitrust cases addressed "bundled discounts", which occur “when a 
seller offers a collection of different goods for a lower price than the 
aggregate price for which it would sell the constituent products 
individually.”).  Since the concierge physicians aren’t presently selling 
amenities separately, it would be very difficult to determine whether 
suspect “bundled discounting” actually occurred.
116
 And, perhaps, the chilling effects of antitrust liability here.  A 
rational seller might decide to vigorously resist any decomposition of a 
package of goods it sells in order to avoid liability for bundling if it 
later decides to sell them together.  Just as balance billing rules may 
unintentionally promote the bundling of amenities into retainer care 
packages, so too might potential antitrust liability for bundling 
unintentionally chill the constructive efforts of sellers to break a 
package of retainer services into its component parts.  Worries over the 
unintended consequences of regulation drive the conclusion, in Part VI 
below, that targeted taxation of the troubling parts of retainer care 
probably amount to the best regulatory response at this time.
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B. What are the Retainer Payments For?
Nevertheless, amenity-bundling is likely to persist, 
because amenities play an important role in the business model of 
concierge physicians: they provide legal cover for the assertion
that retainer payments are compensation for noncovered services.  
Strategic concierge physicians tend to assure that their contracts 
specify that retainer payments are only made in consideration for 
uncovered amenity and preventive care. 117   For example, 
Personal Physicians HealthCare hired attorney Michael Blau to 
legally restructure their practice in order to distinguish payments 
for ordinary medical services and those for preventive and 
amenity care: 
Personal Physicians HealthCare PC was formed to 
provide healthcare services and contracts with all of 
the various insurance payers. Its structure was 
almost identical to that found in the physician’s 
office; and as a corporation, it was authorized to 
offer all medically necessary covered services.
Personal Physicians HealthCare LLC was formed as 
a client services corporation that charges the $4,000 
annual fee.  This umbrella of services would also 
cover PPHC’s in-house nutritionist and personal 
trainer, the doctor-patient communication system of 
email and cell- phone access and other PPHC 
custom-designed patient services.118
117 See, e.g., MDVIP Membership Agreement (section entitled 
“Medical Care Services Excluded from Annual Membership Fee”) 
(attachment to Waxman letter).
118
 Gregory L. Stoller and Christopher Ferrarone, The Patient is 
Always Right: Personal Physicians Healthcare 8 (2004) (copy on file 
with author).  The “dual structure” was also used for accounting 
purposes.  “ ‘[M]ost insurance plans cover medically necessary house 
calls However, if the house call is for the patient’s convenience, then it 
is not covered under insurance and would be “paid for” by the patient’s 
annual fees from the LLC.’”  Id.
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One of the founders of this “dual structured” practice explains 
that the arrangement works in part because “LLC buys time 
from the PC so that our doctors are not busy.”119
Groups like PPHC would like to characterize all these 
LLC payments as being “for” noncovered preventive and amenity 
care, even if they dwarf the amount paid directly for insurance-
covered medical care and the relevant doctors spend more time 
on the latter than the former.  The mere legal form or labeling of 
payments should not dispose of questions about what they are 
actually for. 120    Some of the amenities offered by retainer 
physicians are merely “better services,” but it is unlikely that 
retainer patients paying several thousand dollars annually are 
merely paying for monogrammed bathrobes or friendlier office 
staff.  Rather, these are payments for medical care itself.  
Retainer care services may be usefully categorized as 
amenity, preventively therapeutic, and directly therapeutic.  
Given extant patterns of Medicare funding, we can predict that 
those services falling into the last category would likely qualify 
for Medicare coverage, and those in the first would likely fall 
outside the program’s purview.  Certainly the categories don’t 
directly map onto coverage decisions, which are inevitably 
idiosyncratic given the degree of discretion vested in the 
Secretary by the statute. 121 However, given the number of 
retainer care services that reasonably fall into the “directly 
therapeutic” category, the OIG could reasonably presume that at 
119 Id.
120
 Michael Romano, If you have to ask, you can't afford it; 
Boutique practices getting a hard look from government, doctors' 
group, MODERN HEALTHCARE, March 25, 2002; Lawmakers challenge 
legality of "boutique medicine, CLINICIAN REVIEWS, May 1, 2002, at32 
(Leading Democratic Congressmen “requested a review of the legality 
of these practices,” because  “current law states that providers who do 
not accept the Medicare fee schedule can charge no more than 115% of
the Medicare rate for a covered service.”).
121 Goodman v. Sullivan, 712 F. Supp. 334, 338 (1989) (“Congress 
delegated to the Secretary the authority to promulgate regulations for 
administering the Medicare program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a) (2005), 
and provided the Secretary with great discretion in determining what 
items or services will be covered under Medicare Part B.”)
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least part of the retainer fee charged at many practices is 
supplementing Medicare payment for covered services.122
Many defenders of concierge care claim that the retainers 
only pay for “better service,” not better health care. This 
nomenclatural smoke screen has obscured what’s really 
objectionable about concierge care: the bidding away of primary 
care resources by those wealthy enough to “jump the queue” 
effectively created via tacit managed care rationing.  To the 
extent concierge physicians are bundling amenities with retainer 
care in order to avoid legal liability for double billing, law is 
encouraging the worst distributive consequences of the retainer 
care trend.  Bundled amenities only tend to make concierge care 
more unaffordable, and serve no legitimate therapeutic purpose.
 Admittedly, the valuation of each facet of retained 
services will be difficult.  But to the extent the distinction is a 
sham, insurers should step in to avoid subsidizing the type of 
struggle for positional advantage (in access to care) that queue-
jumping is likely to encourage.   For patients with insurance, 
retainer payments raise the type of “double payment” concerns 
addressed by Medicare’s balance billing rules, the False Claims 
Act, and similar provisions in private insurance contracts.  The 
relevant authorities should scrutinize these arrangements in order 
to minimize the extent to which public and private insurers are 
subsidizing retainer conversions primarily designed to provide 
priority access.  These conversions serve only to fragment the 
risk pools that insurance is designed to unify.
The Medicare program can be powerful policy lever for 
encouraging retainer practices to concentrate on preventive care 
and to avoid promoting the kind of frenzy for position that 
122 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.  HHS has issued a 
memorandum that “states that retainer agreements could be problematic 
if they attempt to substitute for Medicare supplemental insurance 
policies. CMS officials reported encountering problems with physicians 
offering unregulated supplemental policies in the mid-1990s. In June 
2005, CMS officials told [the GAO] that, while such substitutions are 
not allowed, they are no longer concerned that retainer arrangements 
are being used as substitutes for Medicare supplemental insurance.” Id.  
The GAO unhelpfully fails to cite to the date or title of the memo it 
refers to, and a search of the HHS website for the document has proven 
fruitless.   Kenneth T. Bowden II and Lawrence L. Foust, Advanced 
Issues in Provider/Payer Managed Care Contracting and Negotiations
12 (2005) (file on copy with author).
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“queue-jumping” for ordinary medical care may cause. 123   A 
majority of retainer physicians responding to the GAO’s survey 
participate in the Medicare system, and retainer patients skew 
toward the elderly.  By cutting out reimbursements for ordinary 
medical care already paid for by retainer fees, HHS could reduce 
the financial appeal of the retainer model, as well as its potential 
to increase queue-jumping.  Part VI below suggests some 
methods of decomposing the value of the different facets of 
retainer care.  
V. SHOULD RETAINER CARE BE FURTHER REGULATED?
Though Medicare has great influence over the U.S. health 
care system, it does not exhaust the potential range of regulatory 
responses to retainer care.  Balanced billing rules may also prove 
to be too blunt an instrument to simultaneously diminish queue-
jumping and promote preventive care.  Other options, including 
state regulation, may achieve health policy goals in a more 
nuanced way.
Before examining these options, it is important to address 
the normative question—should retainer care be further 
regulated?  Any fair approach to this question requires a careful 
airing of the concerns of concierge physicians and their patients.  
Retainer care physicians’ complaints about regulation 
break down into four main types.  First, many argue that retainer 
care is simply too insignificant a phenomenon to merit sustained 
attention from regulators.  They also  argue that gains in time and 
compensation from concierge care will encourage more medical 
students to become primary care physicians.  Finally, retainer 
care physicians argue that they treat some of the sickest patients, 
and it is unconscionable to deny treatment options to those 
willing and able to afford them.
123
 Admittedly, if Medicare requirements get too burdensome, 
HHS risks losing influence over them to the extent that retainer 
practices exit the public insurance program altogether (and perhaps 
become “cash only”).  See William Buczo, Provider Opt-out, supra 
note 25, at 43.  There are many anecdotal accounts of physicians “about 
to opt out of the system entirely” due to insurers’ burdensome 
administrative requirements. However, a recent study suggests that few 
providers recently given the option to opt-out of Medicare.  Id. 
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Parts A through D below elaborate these concerns and 
critically examine them.  Although advocates of retainer care 
make some compelling arguments for permitting it in a certain 
range of cases, a tailored regulatory response is essential to 
mitigating its worst effects.
A. A Self-Limiting Phenomenon?
Proponents of retainer care have tried to deflect regulation 
by insisting that it is a “self-limiting” phenomenon that would 
only threaten access to care if it were to become widespread.124
A nascent phenomenon in health care finance, retainer medicine 
has not yet affected the vast majority of providers or patients.  
The GAO’s report, one of the most comprehensive so far, stated 
that “The small number of concierge physicians makes it unlikely 
that the approach has contributed to widespread access 
problems.”125 Some predict that is likely to remain the case for 
the foreseeable future. According to one leading academic and 
policy advisor, though “[c]oncierge care may remain attractive to 
a limited number of high income-individuals. . . it is not likely to 
become an important component of the American health care 
system.”126
This characterization of retainer care is essential to its 
current justification.  As the AMA’s Council on Ethics and 
Judicial Affairs warns, if boutique medicine were to become 
widespread, or even to “take over” a certain market, it would 
certainly raise concerns about access.127  But the AMA’s Council 
on Medical Practice downplayed such concerns, and both 
124
 Troyen Brennan summarizes these responses (from health 
lawyers and the AMA) in a seminal article on the topic.  Brennan, 
Luxury Primary Care: Market Innovation or Threat to Access?, 346 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1165, 1167 (2002).   
125 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
126
 Stuart Altman, Concierge-style health care perks not likely to 
revolutionize medical services field, 
http://my.brandeis.edu/news/item?news_item_id=100466&show_releas
e_date=1  (Describing speech by Stuart Altman, a leading health care 
economist and co-chairman of The Massachusetts Governor's and 
Legislative Health Care Task Force.  Massachusetts has been one of the 
least interventionist states with respect to retainer care.)
127 CEJA REPORT, supra note 51, at 3.  
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advisory groups claimed that the value of pluralism in consumer 
and provider options outweighs any negative effects of retainer 
conversions.
As of mid-2005, about 250 physicians have concierge 
practices.128  The largest concierge care network, MDVIP, based 
in Boca Raton, Florida, “has 85 doctors in 14 states serving 
27,000 patients.”129  The GAO reports a continuous growth in 
retainer practice since its inception in 1996.130  Nevertheless, the 
same report concludes that “The small number of concierge 
physicians makes it unlikely that the approach has contributed to 
widespread access problems.” 131   The Medical Practice 
Committee of the American Medical Association goes further on 
the prevalence question, deeming retainer medicine an 
“inherently self-limiting” phenomenon:
The phenomenon of retainer practice is inherently 
self-limiting.  The more physicians charge for their 
services, the smaller the demand for their services.  
Retainer practices will generate higher costs for those 
patients who are willing and able to pay for higher 
levels of service, but not necessarily for those 
patients who cannot afford those higher levels of 
service.  These economic realities limit any potential 
for widespread adoption of retainer practice and any 
potential for growth in retainer practice to adversely 
impact patient access to care.132
This analysis suggests that, like most other luxury goods, retainer 
care will simply be enjoyed by a small elite and will not divert 
128
 Amy Zipkin, The Concierge Doctor is Available (at a Price), 
supra note 50, at 6.
129 Id.
130See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at Appendix C (charting rate of 
prevalence of retainer practices).  
131
 The GAO was directed to study concierge care pursuant to the 
Medicare Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.
132
 F. Maxton “Mac” Mauney,  Report of the Council on Medical 
Service, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/372/cms902.rtf (site last visited March 
1, 2006).
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resources from others. Or if it becomes widespread, physicians 
will flood into the market and increased supply will bring costs 
down.
This simple model of supply and demand ignores several 
peculiarities of the market for professional services in general, 
and medical care in particular.  On the supply side, the number of 
doctors available cannot rapidly increase simply because a new 
model of financing increases demand for their services.  Supply 
is rigidly limited by restrictions imposed both on the number of 
medical schools and on the number of residencies available after 
undergraduate medical education.133  On the demand side, the 
dynamics of positional goods and auction effects are poised to 
push retainer care toward a “tipping point” of ever-increasing 
bidding for physician services. 134 The economics of positional 
goods suggests the rapidity with which bidding wars for superior 
professional services can escalate in response to changes in the 
financing patterns of markets for knowledge-based services.135
It is odd to hear proponents of boutique medicine use its 
rarity as a rationale for not regulating it, since legal controls (or 
uncertainty over their application) may themselves be the reason
for its rarity.  Much health care financing innovation is driven by 
the legal system—including the statutes governing Medicare, 
state insurance law, and the mass of regulations and guidance 
documents that interpret those laws.  It is no surprise that 
133 See KENNETH M. LUDMERER, A TIME TO HEAL: AMERICAN 
MEDICAL EDUCATION FROM THE TURN OF THE CENTURY TO THE ERA 
OF MANAGED CARE 214 (1999) (on the role of the “Liaison Committee 
on Medical Education,” “established in 1942 as a cooperative effort of 
the Association of American Medical Colleges and the Council on 
Medical Education and Hospitals of the American Medical 
Association.”)  
134 ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS 7 (1985) (noting that 
positional goods are "sought after . . . because they compare favorably 
with others in their own class"); FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO 
GROWTH 1-12 (1976) (positing that the pursuit of self-interest to 
advance "to a higher place among one's fellows" results in an 
overconsumption of private goods, reducing the overall net social 
utility).
135 See, e.g., Robert Frank’s discussion of the polarization of 
incomes among dentists in, infra note 150 .
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physicians, uncertain of the legal status of retainer medicine, 
have not rushed to embrace the idea.136    But if the relevant 
authorities were to decisively adopt a laissez-faire position, they 
would greatly diminish the marginal cost of conversion to the 
retainer model caused by legal uncertainty.  Legal uncertainty is 
itself a major cause of the current scarcity of boutique practices, 
and it is simply disingenuous to argue that the former should be 
eliminated on account of the latter.
Supporters of concierge care have argued that retainer 
arrangements are not significant enough to regulate because they 
only affect a small number of providers.  However, regardless of 
the degree of diversion of resources now occurring, boutique 
medicine is likely to prove much more attractive to upper and 
middle class consumers of health care as it gains in notoriety.137
As soon as one person in a reference group purchases concierge 
care, their peers are likely to ask: “How can I deny this to 
myself?  Or my children?”138  Given the special significance of 
health care, there are many consumers who will accept nothing 
less than the “best” available.  As boutique health care creates 
new opportunities to break through extant “ceilings” (upper 
limits) of care generated by public and private insurance systems, 
it generates new channels for the wealthy to bid away resources 
from pooled risk purchasers.   
For example, when considering several brands of 
insurance with similar patterns of coverage, a rational consumer 
136
 Reporting on its survey of retainer physicians, the GAO 
reported that “Various strategies for concierge care practice design 
have been developed to help concierge physicians avoid potential 
Medicare compliance problems, but most of our survey respondents 
expressed a need for more information from HHS to guide them.”   
GAO Report, supra note 1, at 17.
137
 Mike Norbut, Appeal of Retainer Practices: Boutique Care 
Goes Mainstream, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS, August 4, 2003, 
available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2003/08/04/bisa0804.htm. 
138 See, e.g., TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE 
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 6 (1995) 
(describing bandwagon effects of informational cascades in presidential 
primaries and the fashion world); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THEORY OF THE 
LEISURE CLASS 12 (1905); DAVID BROOKS, BOBOS [BOURGEOIS 
BOHEMIANS] IN PARADISE (2004).
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would naturally consider the reimbursement policies of each and 
the degree of access to doctors they permit. Few would want to 
be part of an aggressively cost-containing plan, if only because 
doctors would be more likely to avoid them as patients.139 To the 
extent the plan limited or delayed reimbursement, their 
attractiveness as a patient relative to other insureds would 
drop.140 Conversely, to the extent the plan guaranteed quick or 
generous reimbursement for procedures, an insured’s 
relative attractiveness as a patient would increase.141
Since most large insurance companies’ business plans 
require them to spread risk over thousands of subscribers for each 
particular product they offer, they do not yet offer a very wide 
variety of specifically tailored plans to subscribers. 142 The 
average large employer, for instance, only offers a few different 
plans to its employees.143 However, with the rise of concierge 
care, medical practices are cutting out the middleman and 
offering a tailored version of insurance directly to their 
patients.144
In this way, retainer medicine permits consumers to 
distinguish themselves even further in the pool of insured 
139 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 68, at 
762.
140
 Mark O. Hielper & Brian C. Dunn, Irreconcilable Differences: 
Why the Doctor-Patient Relationship Is Disintegrating at the Hands of 
Health Maintenance Organizations and Wall Street, 25 PEPP. L. REV.
597, 606 (1998).
141
 Deven C. McGraw, Student Author, Financial Incentives to 
Limit Services: Should Physicians Be Required To Disclose These To 
Patients?, 83 GEO. L.J. 1821, 1839 (1995).
142 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE 
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 201 (4th ed., West 2001).
143 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 68.
144
 William Hoffman, American College of Physicians, ACP-ASIM 
Observer, October 2001, available at
http://www.acponline.org/journals/news/oct01/new_model.htm.  In 
order to avoid state regulation of insurance plans, many retainer 
practices dispute this characterization of the fee, claiming that it is 
simply a fee for “better service,” not for “medical care” itself.  I give 
some reasons for skepticism about that characterization in Part VI 
below (discussing the recent history of state insurance regulation 
applicable to provider-sponsored organizations (PSO’s)).  
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patients. Whereas before one could only buy the best health plan 
one’s employer offered, concierge care permits one to leverage 
such a plan into extraordinary primary care and lavish related 
services.145 Meanwhile, the retainer collected by those offering 
this level of service allow them to treat fewer patients while 
making the same (or, often, more) income than they made when 
only third-party insurers paid.146
Therefore, concierge care intensifies the pressures for 
relative position already present in the insurance market. As 
more consumers opt for the concierge model, less doctors are 
available to the rest of the market.  The resulting scarcity makes 
the concierge model all the more relatively attractive, portending 
a self-reinforcing exodus from third-party insurance 
simpliciter to the type of third-party-payor + retainer-payment 
model.
The combined effects of supply restrictions and positional 
competition (by physicians, for income, and patients, for care) 
raise the possibility that concierge care conversions may be a 
self-reinforcing, rather than a self-limiting, phenomenon.  
Looking back on the literature on the conversion of non-profit 
hospitals to for-profit status over the past decade or so, it is 
remarkable how often the terms “rapid,” “sudden,” and 
“revolutionary” are used to describe the development. 147   Of 
course, commentators had several explanations for the apparent 
inevitability of the trend once it was well-established.  The for-
profit chains skimmed off the most profitable work; they had far 
145
 Vasilios J. Kalogredis, Physician’s News Digest, Should You 
Consider Concierge Medicine?, 
http://www.physiciansnews.com/business/204.kalogredis.html (Feb. 
2004).
146
 Andrew Haeg, Minnesota Public Radio, Top Shelf Health 
Care-- If You Have the Money, 
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200206/24_haega_conci
ergecare/ (June 24, 2002).
147 See ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES 
AND LIMITS OF MARKETS 126 (1996) (“Historically, one segment of 
the hospital industry was for-profit, but such hospitals were invariably 
locally owned.  In less than a decade, the vast majority have now 
become owned by absentee companies, usually the result of merger-
and-acquisition binges orchestrated by entrepreneurs.”) (citing Balance 
Sheets that Get Well Soon, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 4, 1995 (80-84).
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more access to capital necessary for technology-intensive care, 
and thereby initiated a competitive dynamic that severely 
disadvantaged non-profits.148  The same trends are now fueling 
the rise of specialty hospitals, which only perform surgeries with 
very high profit margins. 149  These market dynamics may also 
direct the most profitable patients toward retainer care.
Doctors feel increasingly pressed for time with their 
family or outside-work interests, and for money to pay off 
education debt and malpractice insurance.  Few will reject an 
opportunity to increase income and leisure simultaneously 
without serious thought.  MDVIP appears so confident of the 
trend that it has even attempted to franchise its business model.  
More subtle, but just as powerful, pressures are also important.  
Any given primary care physician’s frame of reference for her 
“correct” or “fair” compensation will usually include the other 
doctors in her area who work around the same amount as she 
does. 150  Once one concierge care practice begins reporting 
extraordinarily high incomes, it should not be surprising if others 
follow suit.  Indeed, if retainer care were to become widespread, 
insurance practices may start taking the compensation into 
account in their reimbursement levels, much as restaurant owners 
depend on waiters’ tips to supplement inadequate wages.
Thus retainer care threatens to intensify already-existing 
trends toward polarization of incomes in professional services.   
Previous tiering made specialty practice more remunerative than 
148 Id.
149
 David Armstrong, A Surgeon Earns Riches, Enmity by Plucking 
Profitable Patients, WALL ST. J. 1 (Aug. 2, 2005) (“The debate [over 
surgeon Larry Teuber’s  Black Hills Surgery Center] mirrors national 
concerns about specialty hospitals, which are typically doctor-owned 
for-profit facilities that focus on a narrow range of services.  Critics say 
specialty hospitals harm hospitals that serve poorer and sicker patients, 
and lead to waste of health care dollars by driving people to get 
unneeded surgery.”).  
150
 See Robert H. Frank, The Frame of Reference as a Public 
Good, 107 ECON. J. 1832 (1997).  Frank discusses how satisfaction is 
often directly related to one’s relative position.  In a society where 
nearly all doctors work long hours, no one doctor doing so is likely to 
feel dissatisfied about his or her situation.  However, once a sector 
within the profession begins to work less, at the same (or greater) pay, 
dissatisfaction is likely to arise.  
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primary care; now primary care itself is becoming more stratified.  
Consider the story of dentists, health professionals whose 
reliance on “out-of-pocket” payments has been greater than that 
of physicians for some time.  Among dentists in the 1980’s, there 
was a dramatic shift in the distribution of their
earnings about the median.  Whereas fewer dentists 
earned incomes in the moderately high range of 
$60,000 to $120,000, the numbers increased sharply 
at both the low and high ends of the earnings 
spectrum.151
Robert Frank gives a number of explanations for the trend, 
including the decline in demand for “primary dental services” 
(due to increased fluoride use), the rise in demand for cosmetic 
dentistry, and a decline in the number of students  accepted 
annually to dental school (from around 6,000 in 1982 to 4,000 in 
1994).  Each of these has parallels in a primary medical care field 
affected by retainer care: consumers increasingly seeking direct 
access to specialists (via PPOs) and “cosmetic” amenities like 
better waiting rooms and staff treatment, and a declining number 
of primary care hours available.  A practitioner aware of trends 
in fields like dentistry, sales, and law would be cautious about 
missing out on a chance not only to enhance her current position, 
but also to avoid consignment to the bottom of the physician 
income scale (where those who fail to entrepreneurially market 
their services seem increasingly likely to go).
151 ROBERT H. FRANK, WINNER TAKE ALL SOCIETY 89 (1995).
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B. Physician Shortage?
Advocates of retainer care may accept all the arguments  
made in Part A above, and turn them into another, more forward-
looking argument for concierge medicine.  Even if rapid 
increases in primary care physician incomes cause painful 
adjustments now, they will eventually draw more doctors to the 
field.  To the extent they improve doctors’ salaries and living 
conditions, retainer practices may divert health care dollars to a 
cash-strapped primary care system (and, presumably, away from 
the specialty care that has come to dominate both medical school 
curricula and the professional aspirations of the most ambitious 
medical students).  
Several sources have documented a decline in the number 
of new physicians choosing primary care (although there 
appeared to be a slight uptick in the late 1990s as managed care 
began directing funds to these frontline doctors as 
gatekeepers). 152   Presumably, opportunities for a “lifestyle” 
practice in primary care may cause some would-be 
dermatologists and radiologists to reconsider their 
specialization. 153  More pointedly, those who are strongly 
motivated by monetary gain may be led away from traditional 
specialty choices back to primary care.
This article does not attempt to assess the wisdom of 
drawing more physicians away from specialty practice and into 
primary care.154  However, even if one concedes the desirability 
152 2001 was the fourth straight year that the amount of medical 
school seniors choosing primary care dropped.  American Academy of 
Family Physicians, Comparison of Primary Care Positions, available at
http://www.aafp.org/match/graph05.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).  
153
 These very competitive residencies are in fields that are often 
chosen by those concerned about controlling their hours.  Sid 
Kircheimer, Med Students More Likely to Choose Specialties Based on
Lifestyle, WebMD Medical News (Sept. 2, 2003), available at
http://my.webmd.com/content/article/73/82011.htm (last visited Feb. 
26, 2006).
154
 There has been a great deal of controversy over the proper 
number of physicians in the United States.  There were alarming 
reports of an impending physician shortage in the 1960s. KENNETH 
LUDMERER, TIME TO HEAL, supra note 126, at 398. The federal 
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of this goal, the spread of retainer care seems a singularly 
inefficient way of achieving it.  Physicians in the U.S. already 
earn two to three times as much as their counterparts in 
Europe. 155   To the extent retainer care incentivizes physician 
training by reducing workload, it would tend to exacerbate the 
primary care physician shortage.  Retainer doctors see between 
one-tenth and half of the panels borne by their non-retainer 
peers. 156   Moreover, they primarily serve the type of 
sophisticated, wealthy health care consumers who seem best able 
to navigate the health care system on their own.157  Finally, there 
government responded by increasing funding of undergraduate and 
graduate medical education.  Id., at 401.  Proponents of managed care 
claim that the program “worked too well,” producing a glut of 
overcapacity that third-party payers have only begun to wring out of the 
system.  DAVID DRANOVE, THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION, supra note 
11, at 54. Commenting on the decline in medical school applications in 
the mid-1990’s, Dranove later admits that “with the complex 
combination of incentive problems in the market, it is impossible to 
determine whether we have too few or too many physicians, or receive 
too few or too many services.”  Id., 129.
155
 Gawande, Medicine’s Money Problem, supra note 20  (noting 
average primary care physician salary of about $155,000 in 2003); Paul 
Krugman, The Medical Money Pit, N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 2005, at A16 
(noting that American physicians earn two to three times as much as 
their European counterparts).
156
 John D. Goodson, a primary-care physician and associate 
professor at Harvard Medical School, puts it this way:  “‘Think about 
this in a macro way. . . Say you lose 10 or 15 percent of your doctors. 
In the overall system, you end up reducing by a significant percentage 
the patient-hours of care, and everyone else who's left behind is 
suddenly working harder. There is already a shortage of primary-care 
docs. What's to prevent any doctor from starting to charge fees? The 
whole thing could mean the Balkanization of American medicine."  
Goodson, quoted in Devin Friedman, Dr. Levine’s Dilemma, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., May 5, 2002, at 23.
157 See G. Caleb Alexander, Jacob Kurlander, and Matthew K. 
Wynia, Physicians in Retainer ("Concierge") Practice: A National 
Survey of Physician, Patient, and Practice Characteristics, 20(12) J. 
GEN. INTERN. MED. 1079, 1083 (2005) [hereinafter National Survey] 
(“[W]e found that retainer physicians have smaller proportions of 
patients with diabetes, and perhaps other chronic diseases, than do their 
nonretainer counterparts and they care for fewer African-American and 
Retainer Care
51
appear other, less stratifying alternatives available—such as 
expanding the number of medical schools, the number of doctors 
they train, or the number of foreign nationals permitted to 
practice in the United States.158
Despite these options, groups like the AMA would likely 
point to falling medical school applications as evidence that the 
present level of compensation, prestige, and leisure available to 
physicians is not enough to incentivize the lengthy and costly 
educational investment medical practice now demands. 159
However, given the limited number of patients that retainer 
doctors see, it seems very inefficient to use this type of financing 
arrangement to counteract the trend.  Since retainer care is 
primarily being adopted by more established practices, it seems 
just as likely the physician-hours brought “off line” by retainer 
conversions will swamp the putative wave of new applicants 
drawn to practice by retainer care.  The retainer care model only 
permits doctors to increase income and leisure time by reducing 
the number of patients they see—sometimes quite 
dramatically.160  Finally, and most importantly, the number of 
slots in undergraduate and graduate medical education are fixed, 
Hispanic patients. Given that minorities are already underserved and at 
risk for worse health outcomes, our findings suggest that retainer 
practices could contribute to tiering of health care and to disparities in 
health care according to race as well as wealth.).
158 See, e.g., Mexican Physician Pilot Program, CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE § 853 (discussed in Jeremy Fine Bollinger, Doctoring 
Fraud & Abuse, supra note 29, at 513).
159
 Randal C. Archibold, Applications To Medical Schools Decline 
For Second Straight Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1999, at A23 (noting 
that factors in the decline include "a more difficult job market for 
medical school graduates, and complaints by doctors of excessive 
paperwork and a loss of autonomy brought on by the growth of 
managed care." Additionally, "Jordan Cohen, president of the 
American Association of Medical Colleges, agreed that the economy 
might explain the decline but also blamed the growth of managed 
care.").
160 See Alexander, et al., National Survey, supra note 157, at 1082 
(“Retainer physicians have much smaller patient panels (mean 898 vs 
2303 patients, P<.0001) than their nonretainer counterparts, and care 
for fewer African-American (mean 7% vs 16%, P<.002), Hispanic (4% 
vs 14%, P<.001), or Medicaid (5% vs 15%, P<.001) patients.”).
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and there are far more applicants than slots for each.161  Even if 
retainer care somehow motivated a massive increase in the 
number of medical school applications, its proponents identify no 
mechanism that would lead to a commensurate increase in the 
capacity of medical schools to educate them.162
C. Treating the Sickest Patients?
Proponents of concierge care claim that it takes upon 
itself a reverse moral hazard that ultimately alleviates pressures 
on the health care system.  Given a simple model mapping 
demand for health care to willingness to pay, only those patients 
needing the most attention from the health care system should be 
willing to pay for concierge care.  This is a potentially powerful 
argument given the concentration of health care costs among the 
161
 “U.S. medical schools graduate roughly 17,000 new physicians 
every year, out of over 45,000 students a year who apply.”  The Doctor 
Quota, J. COMMERCE, March 4, 1997, at 8A (describing “campaign” by 
U.S. doctors to “restrict the number of foreign-trained physicians in the 
United States.”).  The AMA strictly controls the number of medical 
schools, and "There are still two applications for every opening at 
medical school, and, on average, the academic qualifications of 
applicants hasn't changed. So there is still a cadre of highly qualified, 
dedicated, and smart people going to medical school.” Barzansky, 
quoted in Sid Kircheimer, Med Students More Likely to Choose 
Specialties Based on Lifestyle, WEBMD MEDICAL NEWS (Sept. 2, 
2003), available at http://my.webmd.com/content/article/73/82011.htm 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
162
 Indeed, the medical profession’s tight control over the number 
of doctors is the main cause of the current primary care physician 
shortage.  See Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Economic and Moral Case for 
Lettting the Market Determine the Health Workforce, in THE US 
HEALTH WORKFORCE: POWER, POLITICS, AND POLICY 8 (Ellen 
Osterweis, et al., eds., 1996) (arguing that “advocate[s] for artificial 
limits on entry into the profession ought to be able to explain . . . [to] 
the thousands of qualified and highly motivated American youngsters 
who have vainly sought entry into medical school and who quite 
probably would have been willing to practice medicine at rates much 
below those now customary in the profession [why] their rejection 
serves the nation’s best interest.”)
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chronically ill (i.e., the sickest 10% of the population). 163   If 
retainer physicians are treating the sickest patients, they may well 
be reducing demand for health care to the same extent their 
retainer care conversions reduce the supply of primary care 
physician-hours.
There are several reasons to doubt this possibility.  
Although health care costs in general may be concentrated 
among the chronically ill, there is little evidence that primary 
care demand is similarly focused on this group.  More directly, 
given the high percentage of retainer physicians reporting more 
leisure time after the transition to concierge care, it seems 
incongruous to attribute to them the assumption of the burden of 
the sickest.  As the most recent comprehensive study of retainer 
practices noted, 
[C]ritics of retainer practices have argued that these 
practices might attract wealthier and healthier 
patients (the "worried well") rather than sick patients 
with complex illnesses, who tend to be less wealthy 
but who might benefit most from the additional 
attention retainer practices can offer. . . . [W]e found 
that retainer physicians have smaller proportions of 
patients with diabetes, and perhaps other chronic 
diseases, than do their nonretainer counterparts and 
they care for fewer African-American and Hispanic 
patients.164
163 John V. Jacobi, Consumer-Drirected Health Care and the 
Chronically Ill, 38 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 531, 572 (2005) (“Consider 
how consumer-driven care will affect spending for those on the upper 
end of the consumption curve--the 10 percent accounting for 70 percent 
of the cost. Those with severe acute and chronic illnesses will incur
costs that dwarf their HSA contribution and deductible. Despite the 
savings gained by transferring these initial costs to the sickest 
members, sponsors gain no cost-saving value from HSAs for the lion's 
share of annual health expenditures.”)
164
 Alexander, et al., National Survey, supra note 157, at 1082. The 
authors of the study do concede that “Our data are limited to 
physicians' estimates of their patients' demographic and illness 
characteristics and therefore do not allow for examination of case-mix 
severity in detail.”  Id.
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To understand demand for retainer medicine, we should focus 
less on the concentration of care on the chronically ill and more 
on the concentration of resources in the hands of the wealthiest.
D. Freedom of Contract? 
In the face of these challenges, retainer care advocates are 
likely to fall back on freedom of contract.  To the extent that 
powerful private insurers have attempted to perform the roles of 
rationing and cost-containment required of national governments, 
it is not surprising that consumers are attempting to contract 
around their strictures in order to purchase care. 165 Even if 
retainer care has doubtful positive social impact, why shouldn’t 
individual patients and doctors have the right to contract with 
each other for retainer services? 
Retainer care advocates take some comfort in the 
existence of “parallel private systems” of health care that exist in 
nearly all nations with a dominant national health care system.166
As Timothy Jost has observed, 
In countries with universal public health services 
(the Beveridge model), persons who purchase 
private health insurance do so in order to obtain 
health services more quickly and conveniently, in 
more pleasant settings, or from more prestigious 
165
 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can't We Do What They Do? 
National Health Reform Abroad,   32 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 433, 434
(2004) (“Access to health care would no longer depend on belonging to 
a social insurance plan (which was usually, in some sense, 
employment-related), but rather would be free at point-of-service to all 
residents. Thus, universal coverage was created independent of the 
economic or employment status of any individual.”). 
166
 Jost, supra note 165, at 435 (“social-insurance and national 
health insurance nations usually allow for individuals the choice to 
carry private insurance. France and Austria, for instance, requires 
mandatory coverage for the entire population, while Germany and the 
Netherlands requires participation in social insurance programs for only 
the indigent.”).
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professionals than is possible under the public 
system to which they also have access.167
Even the Quebec health care system, which had long attempted to 
discourage “contracting around,” has now been forced to permit 
it due to a recent Canadian Supreme Court ruling.168
Given that even the most egalitarian national insurance 
systems permit the wealthy to purchase either more immediate 
access to health care or better health care, restrictions on boutique 
medicine in the United States’s highly privatized system might 
seem incongruous.  If the Canadian Supreme Court has decreed a 
fundamental right to purchase health care above and beyond that 
provided by the state, even at the cost of diverting suppliers away 
from the system overall, 169  how can a sensible American 
167
 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care Regulation: Can We 
Learn From Others? The Chilean Experience, 32 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 863, 864 (1999) (citing Deborah J. Chollet & Maureen Lewis, 
Private Health Insurance: Principles and Practice, in INNOVATIONS IN 
HEALTH CARE FINANCING 104-09 (George J. Schieber, ed., 1997)) 
(describing the role of private health insurance in 10 OECD and 36 
non-OECD countries).  Jost explains that “In the United Kingdom, for 
example, persons rely on private insurance normally to permit queue-
jumping for certain kinds of surgery, while in Australia private 
insurance pays for hospital care in private facilities. In some countries 
with social health insurance systems (the Bismark model), on the other 
hand, private health insurance is limited to persons, usually with high 
incomes, who are not legally obligated to participate in the national 
social insurance program.  This is the situation, for example, in 
Germany and the Netherlands.”  Id.
168 Jacques Chaoulli and George Zeliotis v. Attorney General of 
Quebec and Attorney General of Canada, 2005 SCC 35 (CanLII) 
(2005) (holding that sections of the Health Insurance Act which 
outlawed private medical insurance violated the right to personal 
inviolability as guaranteed by the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms).
169
 This diversionary impact is a well-documented phenomenon.  
See Michael Calnan, The NHS and Private Health Care, 10 HEALTH 
MATRIX 3, 16 (2000) (noting that parallel private system in the United 
Kingdom “redistribute[d] access to resources and manpower in favour 
of better off patients of working age who live in London and South East 
England” as “[t]he more privileged sick (in terms of income, class and 
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commentator propose to limit the same process here?  There are 
three main reasons why retainer care in these single payer 
systems poses less of a concern than it does in the United States.
First, each of the nations that permits tiering also provides 
universal insurance.  Though the United States has a patchwork 
of law, charity, and government assistance that assures eventual 
care to everyone once their condition reaches a certain level of 
seriousness (or once they are impoverished enough), this 
patchwork does not assure the same level of social provision for 
the neediest prevalent in more social democracies.170   Therefore, 
concerns about diversion of care are not nearly as pronounced in 
these countries as they are in the United States.  And recent 
studies have demonstrated that even in these systems, there are 
significant diversionary concerns.171
power) have been ‘substituted’ for the less fortunate sick who remain 
on NHS lists”).     
170 See Jacobi, Ends of Health Insurance, supra note 5, at 315 
(“While many European countries maintain pockets of private 
insurance or are experimenting with competitive components to a 
statutory health insurance system, only the United States relies on a 
competitive private marketplace and voluntary coverage to provide 
health insurance to the majority of its citizens.”). 
171
 Michael Calnan, The NHS and Private Health Care, 10 
HEALTH MATRIX 3, 17 (2000) (“Certainly, the claims that the 
introduction of market economy principles into the NHS in 1991 has 
led to a two-tier system of care (patients registered with fund holding 
practices have easier access to care than those in non-fund holding 
practices). This might have been one of the reasons why the new 
Labour government has abolished the internal market and fund 
holding.”); J. Cullis, Waiting Lists and Health Policy, in RATIONING 
AND RATIONALITY IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE 23-27 (S. 
Frankel and R. West, eds., 1993);   Canadian Health Services Research 
Foundation, Myth: A parallel private system would reduce waiting time 
in the public system, available at
http://www.chsrf.ca/mythbusters/pdf/myth17_e.pdf (arguing that 
England and Australia both have private systems, and that it's been 
determined that waits for public health care are longest in areas that 
have the most private coverage.); Canadian Health Services Research 
Foundation, Private Care and Public Waiting, available at
http://www.aha.asn.au/publications/articles/issues/ahr_29_1_0205/ahr_
29_1_087-093.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (reaching the conclusion 
that private care leads to longer public waits.); Parallel Private Health 
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Second, nearly all of these countries enjoy lower levels of 
“background inequality” than the United States.  As Robert Frank 
has argued, positional bidding dynamics are most pronounced in 
countries with high levels of inequality.172  There is simply more 
discretionary income to spend on health care, leading to greater 
potential diversion of resources once the wealthy start bidding on 
enhanced access to a pool of primary care physicians whose 
supply is relatively fixed in the short and medium term.173
Finally, more progressive income taxation in these 
universal systems dampens supply-side pressures toward 
concierge care as well.  As advocates of laissez-faire never tire of 
reminding us, higher income tax rates reduce the incentive to 
Insurance in Australia: A Cautionary Tale and Lessons for Canada, 
available at ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp515.pdf (an 
Australian study reaching the conclusion that a second, private tier 
creates more problems than it solves, most notably a decrease in public 
access to health care.).
172 See FRANK AND COOK, THE WINNER TAKE ALL SOCIETY 216 
(1995) (proposing progressive taxation to reduce the inequality that 
exacerbates positional pressures). 
173
 “Estimates suggest that as one's income increases by some 
percentage, the demand for health insurance also increases, but at 
roughly half that rate.”  Joseph P. Newhouse & Charles E. Phelps, NEW 
ESTIMATES OF PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES OF MEDICAL CARE 
SERVICES, IN THE ROLE OF HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE HEALTH 
SERVICES SECTOR 261 (Richard N. Rosett, ed., 1976).  “Medical 
tourists” from the “first world” are promoting the segmentation of the 
health sector in many countries.  Health Care Systems and Approaches 
to Health Care Report, available at http://www.ghwatch.org/2005 
report/B1.pdf (“Health care systems in some countries are being 
segmented even further by the processes of globalization– in India, 
Mexico and South Africa private providers cater to foreign ‘medical 
tourists’ from high-income countries or from high-income groups in 
low- and middle-income countries.  The assumption behind these 
policies is that it is more efficient and equitable to segment health care 
according to income level – a public sector focused on the poor and a 
private system for the rich that allows the public sector to focus on the 
poor. But there is no evidence that such a system is more equitable or 
efficient. The greater likelihood is that it would result in increased 
inequality as the middle-classes opt out of public sector provision, take 
their financial resources and stronger political voice with them, and 
leave the public service as a ‘poor service for poor people.’”).
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maximize one’s income.  We can therefore expect the higher 
income tax rates in social democracies to diminish physicians’ 
incentive to switch to a concierge model.
VI. CRAFTING A TAILORED REGULATORY RESPONSE
The concerns raised in Part V above suggest that retainer 
care deserves more, not less, regulation.  Part IV suggested a 
principled way for the Medicare program to discourage 
concierge care by applying balanced billing rules.  The federal 
government could also seek to apply the False Claims Act.  
Since the fee is flat, a patient seeking to “amortize her 
investment” might go to the doctor very frequently.  
Unnecessary visits might constitute “services substantially in 
excess of the patient’s needs,” which cannot be compensated in 
accordance with that act.174  Finally, if concierge services are 
offered to Medicare beneficiaries at below-market rates, they 
may constitute “inducements” forbidden under the relevant fraud 
and abuse laws.175
Yet there is a cost to such federal regulation.  Overly 
aggressive federal interventions could squelch all forms of 
retainer care.  Most of the physicians pioneering retainer 
174 ALICE G. GOSFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD, supra 
note 27. (paraphrasing 42 USCA § 1320a-7(b)(6) (2005)).
175
 42 U.S.C. § 1128A(i)(5) (2004); 42 C.F.R. 1003.101 (2004). 
For a brief account of inducement provisions, see OIG Bulletin, 
Offering Gifts and Other Inducements to Beneficiaries, 
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/SABGiftsandInd
ucements.pdf, Aug. 2002 (“The OIG will apply the inducement 
prohibition against the following: inexpensive gifts that have a retail 
value of no more than $10 individually, and no more than $50 in the 
aggregate annually per patient.” Also included are a series of statutory 
and regulatory exceptions. See also Jennifer Russano, Is Boutique 
Medicine a New Threat, supra note 40, at 336 (“If boutique medical 
practices provide their patients with bonuses such as "heated towel 
racks, free hotel rooms, [and] special bathrobes," these amenities could 
violate the federal anti-kickback statute or the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act prohibiting such inducements.  
However, since these amenities are offered after payment of a retainer, 
it is likely that they will be seen as services provided in exchange for 
payment and not as an "inducement."”).
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practices are committed professionals whose first priority is 
providing quality health care.  They are pioneering innovative 
preventive care, and at least that aspect of retainer care deserves 
to be encouraged.
Is there a way to craft a more tailored regulatory 
response?  In conditions of uncertainty, policymakers often turn 
to the states as “laboratories of democracy.”  Concentrated in big 
cities on the coasts, retainer care practices have already attracted 
some scrutiny from state regulators.  These embryonic 
interventions, as well as established state practices in cognate 
areas of health care “tiering,” provide a good starting point for 
discussion of future regulation of retainer care.  
The real challenge for policymakers is to craft a tailored 
regulatory response to retainer care that discourages queue-
jumping and amenity-bundling while promoting preventive care.  
States have begun to do so by characterizing retainer practices as 
insurance providers.  However, given the legal complexity of this 
strategy, insurance regulation may not prove an effective way of 
tailoring regulation.  Rather, taxation targeted at the queue-
jumping and amenity-bundling aspects of retainer care would 
provide a more effective response.  Already applied to cosmetic 
surgery and specialty hospitals, such taxation of retainer care—
particularly when directed at assuring access for the poor—would 
assure some principled results from the tiering retainer care is 
entrenching.
A. Retainer Care Agreement as Insurance Contract?
Since they sell unlimited amounts of physician time in 
return for a flat fee, concierge care agreements have been deemed 
a form of insurance in several states. 176    As the deputy 
176
 Sandi Doughton, State Looks Askance at Extra Fees for 
Doctors, supra note 63, at B1 (“A draft ruling from the Insurance 
Commissioner's Office says certain retainers and other charges are 
illegal.  Doctors who require insured patients to pay retainer fees for 
routine medical care are violating state law, says a draft ruling from the 
Washington Insurance Commissioner's Office.  And "concierge" health 
services, under which clients pay a flat rate for personalized medical 
care, may be illegal if they're not licensed as health insurers, the 
commissioner's office says.” 
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commissioner of insurance in Washington stated, "The critical 
element of the transaction is that risk of the patient's utilization of 
health-care services during the period is transferred from the 
patient to the provider for a set amount."177  Even if a doctor 
purposely limits her panels to a low number, she risks 
simultaneous demands for care from two or more patients. 178
Furthermore, retainer practices might go out of business before 
they can fulfill their promise to provide care.179  Each of these 
risks is reminiscent of the types of problems insurers often have 
to bond or reinsure against.180
177
 Peter Neurath, Medical Retainer Fees Violate Law, Ruling 
Says: State Law Bars Doctors From Charging Extra Fees, PUGET 
SOUND BUSINESS JOURNAL, August 1, 2003, available at 
http://seattle.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/2003/08/04/story6.html?t=
printable.  The relevant state official, Deputy Insurance Commissioner 
Berendt, conceded that “No rules prevent doctors from charging extra 
for optional services that aren't already covered by the patient's health 
insurance, such as nutritional counseling, valet parking or 24-hour 
cellphone access to doctors, Berendt said. It's also fine for doctors to 
charge special fees to patients who aren't covered by insurance.”  She 
also elaborated that “[t]he fee is paid by the patient regardless of the 
amount of services provided [and] even if no services are provided. 
These arrangements result in a transfer of risk and, in essence, are 
insurance agreements.”  Id.  Office of Insurance Commissioner for the 
State of Washington, Forum for Review of Draft Technical Advisories 
to Health Carriers and their Participating Providers (August 12, 
2003), available at
http://www.insurance.wa.gov/special/accessfees/removed/public%5Ffo
rum%5Fpresentation.ppt (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
178
 Steven Flier did this when he began PPHC; “We intentionally 
set the panel very low, at about 300 patients per physician.”  Quoted in 
Ferrarone and Stoller, supra note 118, at 6. Some “platinum” concierge 
practices  may only contract with 50 families per physician.  Id.
179
 Though I have not yet found examples of large upfront fees 
paid in exchange for “lifetime care,” it is interesting to note that one of 
the earliest insurance plans involved the exchange of an assurance of a 
lifetime of care in return for investment in its infrastructure.  
180
 Robert M. Portman, Back to the Future of Medicine, supra note 
2, at 3 (2003) (“To the extent that concierge practices charge their 
members a fixed, prepaid amount for a bundle of guaranteed services, 
they could be found to be providing insurance in violation of state 
law.”)  Any insurance provider must be registered with the state and 
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Washington 181  and New Jersey 182  have been most 
aggressive, issuing rules and interpretations that tightly regulated 
retainer care. Other states have issued warnings and guidances, 
but have done little to actually intervene. 183    If they were 
regulated as insurers, retainer practices would have to satisfy 
potentially onerous capitalization requirements, and could not be 
bonded against the possibility it cannot provide the services/coverage 
purchased in advance in consideration for the premium.    
181 Id. According to Portman, “the Washington Insurance 
Commissioner has issued a pair of draft technical assistance advisories 
in which it has determined that health care providers entering into 
arrangements to provide a package of health care services for a fixed, 
pre-paid fee must first obtain a certificate of registration from the state 
as either a health care service contractor or health maintenance 
organization. In a separate draft advisory, the commissioner concluded 
that health care providers that require patients to pay access fees to 
receive services covered by their health insurance are acting in 
violation of state laws requiring providers and plans not to charge more
than the covered amount and to hold patients harmless from any 
amounts not covered by insurance.”
182
 Bowden and Foust, Advanced Issues in Provider/Payer 
Managed Care, supra note 115. (“During the summer of 2003 
insurance regulators in Washington State circulated two draft 
advisories warning against ‘access’ fees and regulators in New Jersey 
issued a bulletin ordering providers to immediately terminate charging 
patients access, retention, or service fees.”).
183
 Some appear to tacitly, if not explicitly, endorse boutique 
medicine as a legitimate new method of health care financing. See
Robert M. Portman, Concierge Care: Back to the Future of Medicine, 
supra note 2, at 6.  (“The Massachusetts Department of Insurance 
investigated Personal Physicians Health Care for discriminating against 
patients who couldn't afford its annual fee but apparently found no 
violation of state insurance laws as long as beneficiaries were advised 
that insurance would not cover the extra fees. The Massachusetts Board 
of Registration in Medicine, which licenses Massachusetts physicians, 
also reportedly found nothing illegal about concierge practices.”)  
According to Flier, he repeatedly met with state officials before 
launching the pioneer Boston retainer practice, Personal Physicians 
HealthCare, and currently retains lobbyists to assure favorable 
regulatory treatment.  Ferrarone and Stoller, supra note 118, at 10.   
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as flexible in choosing their panels.184  Concierge practices have 
aggressively lobbied for exceptions or favorable interpretations 
of the relevant laws, and appear to have stalled legal 
interventions in two states.185
For example, the state of Washington initially moved 
rather aggressively to characterize retainer practices as 
insurers, 186  thereby requiring them to certify that they are 
financially prepared to deal with the “risks” of the practice.187
184
 Sandi Doughton, State looks askance at extra fees for doctors, 
supra note 63, at B1..  (“[I]f doctors want to provide a broad range of 
medical services for a set fee, they may need to be licensed and 
regulated as insurers. The state requires insurers to prove they are 
financially healthy and not likely to go out of business and leave 
consumers with no medical care, [Deputy Insurance Commissioner] 
Berendt said. The state also makes it difficult for insurers to kick out 
patients.”). 
185
 Sandi Doughton, State looks askance at extra fees for doctors, 
supra note 66, at B1.
186 Id. (“Seattle Medical Associates doesn't get any money from 
Medicare or other insurance companies. If patients are referred to 
specialists outside the group, those specialists bill insurance or 
Medicare separately. But according to the commissioner's preliminary 
rulings, the group may require a state insurance license, because it 
operates somewhat like an insurance company.”)
187 See Kenneth T. Bowden and Lawrence Foust, Advanced Issues 
in Provider/Payer Managed Care, supra note 115, at 6 (“Without 
referring to its companion advisory regarding the business of insurance, 
the latter advisory offered that access fees could be charged to patients 
without violating statutory hold harmless provisions if the services 
offered for the fee were truly noncovered and the fees were optional. 
Mandatory fees could be charged when the patient is uninsured, the 
provider is non-participating, or the patient is covered under an 
indemnity policy that does not require use of a participating provider. 
The draft advisories have been withdrawn before being finalized. In 
addition, the Insurance Commissioner withdrew the pursuit of H.B. 
2815 in the 2004 Washington Legislature in order to “develop 
legislation that would address the needs of everyone.” See also John R. 
Marquis, Legal Issues Involved in Concierge Medical Practices, supra
note 3, at 18 (also implying that the Washington Insurance 
Commissioner is currently trying to develop a consensus on regulation 
of retainer care, due to the Washington State Medical Society’s 
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One regulator has also attempted to undermine the legal basis of 
conversions to retainer care, stating that “it's illegal to force 
patients who have health insurance to pay a retainer fee simply to 
keep their existing doctor or to get services their health-care 
policy already guarantees.” 188   After retainer physicians and 
clients registered their vehement opposition to such rules, the 
“draft technical assistance advisories” announcing the agency’s 
position disappeared from the state government’s website, and 
officials have announced an effort to find “common ground.”
New Jersey regulators also began with an aggressive 
approach, but failed to garner support from the politicians.  The 
New Jersey Department of Health and Human Services and 
Department of Banking and Insurance have issued a 
memorandum prohibiting insurers from contracting with doctors 
who require patients to pay fees for access, even when fees are 
for additional services.189  The Departments asserted that New 
Jersey’s “non-discrimination” laws prevent practitioners 
participating in managed care networks from conditioning access 
to their clinic on retainer-like payments. 190   However, it is 
difficult to assess the legal force of this document, and it is hard 
successful opposition to the Insurance Commissioner’s effort to get the 
legislature to “codify the content” of its advisories as a statute).  
188
 Michael and Laura B. Benko, These doctors and their affluent 
patients find themselves in exclusive company, supra note 67, at 38. 
(“Paul Ginsburg, president of the Center for Studying Health System 
Change, a Washington-based research group, says there's nothing to 
stop a physician from charging wealthy, fee-for-service clients 
whatever they choose. The problem, he says, arises when companies 
such as MDVIP offer services only to members, thus denying access to 
many longtime patients either unwilling or unable to pay the annual 
fees.”).
189 See Holly Bakke and Clifton Lacy, Impermissible Practice of 
Retainer Medicine by Network Physicians, available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/health/hcsa/bulletins/joint2003-02.pdf
190
 “Rather, the Departments’ position is that retainer agreements 
are inconsistent with the requirement that all provider agreements 
subject to New Jersey law assure that in-network providers do not 
discriminate in treatment of members or covered persons.” New Jersey 
DHSS/DOBI Bulletin, citing N.J.A.C. § 8:38-15.2(b)8 and N.J.A.C. § 
8:38A-4.15(b)7.
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to find evidence that retainer care has been eliminated in New 
Jersey.191
Regulation of retainer practices as insurance may be on 
shaky ground legally as well as politically.  Such regulation 
hinges on an assertion that retainer practices bear risk in a 
manner similar to that of traditional insurers.192  However, it is 
easy to imagine ways of contracting out of such risk.  For 
example, a retainer contract might promise 24/7 attention, unless 
another member of the plan demanded the physician’s attention 
immediately before one calls.  Or it might shift the risk of 
insolvency onto the patient, or effectively disguise the transfer of 
risk by having the patient pay in arrears instead of in advance.  
Finally, even though sick patients may be very demanding of 
their primary care physician’s time, the physician is not 
promising the broad range of services traditionally packaged by 
insurers.  If the baseline contract for additional services is legal, it 
is difficult to see how these limitations on service would be 
forbidden.  Professor Thomas Mayo has questioned Washington 
state’s application of its insurance laws to retainer practices: 
In what sense do the doctors take on risk?  The care 
isn't pre-paid with the retainer; only access is pre-
paid. The patient's health insurer is going to be 
tapped for the care, and no part of the insurer's risk is 
being shifted downstream to the physician. Granted, 
there is some risk that the demand for services at any 
given time might outstrip the physician's ability to 
schedule, but that's not a financial risk, is it?193
191
 John R. Marquis, Legal Issues Involved in Concierge Medical 
Practices, supra note 3, at 18.
192
 This is an attractive “peg” to hang regulation on, since many 
retainer practices contract for an unknown amount of care for a fixed 
annual fee.  The retainer physician risks taking on extraordinarily 
demanding patients who may well demand far more care than average. 
193 See Mayo, Medical retainer fee (a/k/a "boutique medicine") 
nixed in Washington, HEALTHLAWBLOG, August 5, 2003, available at
http://healthlawblog.blogspot.com/2003/08/medical-retainer-fee-aka-
boutique.html.  Nevertheless, one practitioner warns that any retainer 
practice which “provides unlimited physician office visits” might end 
up being regulated as an insurer.  Robert M. Portman, Concierge Care: 
Back to the Future of Medicine, supra note 1, at 5 (“Unlike physician 
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Some mid-1990s guidelines regarding the regulation of “provider 
sponsored organizations” echoed this distinction, noting that 
providers could commit to potentially unlimited amounts of their 
own time (in return for a fee), and this would not represent 
financial risk.194
B. Targeting Queue-Jumping and Amenity-Bundling via 
Taxation
Given the legal uncertainty surrounding the regulation of 
concierge care agreements as insurance, another tool of legal 
intervention is likely necessary.  An indisputably positive facet of 
extant retainer care practices provides an important clue on where 
to look.  Some boutique medicine practitioners use the time 
gained from retainer practice to provide pro bono care—a model 
well-established in legal practice. 195   Moreover, some large 
retainer practices, such as one based at Tufts University, directly 
subsidize access to care for the disadvantaged. Instead of 
“passing the retainer fee from wealthy patients to wealthy 
networks or IPAs, which have generally been found not to be insurance 
companies because there is another risk bearing entity in the chain of 
treatment and payment--i.e., a health insurer or HMO--is subject to 
state insurance regulations, concierge practices that do not accept 
insurance and provided prepaid medical care may be perceived as the 
only risk bearing entity in the patient's chain of care.”).  
194
 Allison Overbay and Mark Hall, Insurance Regulation of 
Providers That Bear Risk, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 361 (1996); Edward B. 
Hirshfeld, et al., Structuring Provider-Sponsored Organizations: The 
Legal and Regulatory Hurdles, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 297 (Sept. 1999); 
John S. Conniff, Regulating Managed Health Care Provider Sponsored 
Organizations, 16 J. INS. REG. 377 (1998).  Federal regulation has also 
sparked academic commentary.  See, e.g., Michael O. Spivey, 
Developing Provider-Sponsored Organization Solvency Standards 
Through Negotiated Rulemaking, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 261 (1999).
195
 Jennifer Silverman, Retainer practices reporting better care, 
supra note 52, at 71 (“Charity care for retainer physicians averaged 
9.14 hours per months versus 7.48 hours per month for nonretainer 
practices.”). 
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physicians, the hospital is using the money to subsidize the 
hospital’s primary care practice.”196
To the extent these countervailing, socially conscious 
practices arise out of retainer care, we might say that it causes 
“difference principled” tiering, after the famous proviso of 
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (stipulating that any increase in 
inequality was acceptable to the extent it raised the welfare of the 
least well off).197  It is doubtful that such “difference principled” 
tiering currently outweighs the “brute tiering” that denies the 
services of retainer doctors to those who cannot afford their fees.  
However, states can begin using targeted taxation to alleviate 
brute tiering and promoting “difference principled” tiering arising 
out of retainer care.
For example, states have already addressed the diversion 
of medical resources to nonmedical ends via tax policy in the 
context of plastic surgery.  New Jersey has imposed a 6 percent 
tax on cosmetic plastic surgery procedures.198  Illinois has been 
considering a similar effort with redistributive designs—funds 
from a “vanity tax” would be earmarked for medical research.199
A similar tax on the amenities bundled into concierge care 
196
 This is the Tufts-New England Medical Center plan featured in 
Steve Smith, The Boutique Medicine Boom: Perspectives on the 
Growth of a Controversial Trend, PRACTICE BUILDERS, Sept./Oct. 
2003, at 1.
197 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (1971) ("All social 
values--liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of 
self-respect--are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution 
of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage.").
I have coined the term “difference principled” to designate tiering that 
is both principled, and in accord with Rawls’s theory of justice. 
198
 N.J.S.A. § 54:32E-1 (2005) (“There is imposed and shall be 
paid a tax of 6% on the gross receipts from a cosmetic medical 
procedure, which shall be paid by the subject of the cosmetic medical 
procedure . . . .”); see also Susan Jones, New Jersey Taxes Cosmetic 
Surgery, CNSNEWS, July 1, 2004, available at 
http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewNation.asp?Page=%5CNation%5Carchi
ve%5C200407%5CNAT20040701a.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
199
 Beth Kapes, Vanity Tax Would Fund Stem Cell Research, 
COSMETIC SURGERY TIMES, May 1, 2005, available at
http://www.cosmeticsurgerytimes.com/cosmeticsurgerytimes/article/art
icleDetail.jsp?id=157357 (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
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agreements would help assure that some portion of the money 
spent to divert medical resources to nonmedical ends would itself 
be diverted back toward genuine health care.
Admittedly, valuation problems are sure to arise.  Just as 
New Jersey regulators have been skeptical about retainer 
physicians’ ability to distinguish between ordinary medical care 
(meriting insurance reimbursement) and retainer services (paid 
for by retainer fees), critics of my proposal may charge that 
retainer clients are paying for the entire experience of retainer 
care and that no particular aspect of that experience can be 
disaggregated from the whole and given a market value.  
However, as the diversity of concierge practices increases, it 
should be easier to perform the type of hedonic pricing that has 
allowed economists to, for example, price the value of an eighth-
story view of a park.200  No one sells “eighth-story views of 
parks” on eBay, but economists can compare the prices of very 
similar apartments with and without such views and develop a 
rough sense of how much the view itself contributes to the value 
of the property.201  Similarly, we can begin to assess the value of 
a given retainer perquisite by comparing the cost of joining that 
200 See Maureen L. Cropper and Wallace E. Oates, Environmental 
Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 675, 703-710 (discussing how 
“the price of a house or job can be decomposed into the prices of the 
attributes that make up the good, such as air quality,” and assessing 
methods of such decomposition, including wage-amenity studies, 
hedonic labor markets, and hedonic travel costs).  See also Brian 
Binger et al., The Use of Contingent Valuation Methodology in Natural 
Resource Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction, 89 
NW. U. L. REV. 1029 (1995); F.B. Croos, Natural Resource Valuation, 
42 VAND. L. REV. 269 (1989); David McKay, CERCLA's Natural 
Resource Damage Valuation Provisions: A Comprehensive and 
Innovative Approach to Protecting the Environment, 45 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1417 (1988).
201
 In the hedonic pricing method, “an attempt is made to estimate 
an implicit price for environmental attributes by looking at real markets 
in which these characteristics are effectively traded.  Thus, ‘clean air’ 
and ‘peace and quiet’ are effectively traded in the property market since 
purchasers of houses and land do consider these environmental 
dimensions as characteristics of property.”  PEARCE AND MORAN, THE 
ECONOMIC VALUE OF BIODIVERSITY 67 (1995).
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practice with the cost of joining a practice that offers all but that 
perquisite.
Less ambitiously, regulators may just ask for an 
accounting of the cost of the amenities provided by the retainer 
practice.  Personal Physicians HealthCare of Boston has spent at 
least a million dollars on a luxury waiting area appointed with 
fine furniture and art. 202   A rough accounting of the practice 
resources and physician time devoted to amenity services should 
provide some basis for a tax on them.
Some forward-looking retainer practices have begun to 
recognize and counteract their negative effects on access to care.  
For example, one teaching hospital in Massachusetts has used 
retainers to fund its charity care. 203 To the extent a retainer 
practice takes on this type of redistribution itself, it might be 
exempted from taxation designed for the same ends. 204
Furthermore, a state may decide not to tax retainer revenues that 
support preventive care services not covered by insurance.
Taxation is an important policy tool here because 
increasing numbers of retainer physicians may evade insurance-
leveraged regulation by becoming “cash-only.” 205   This latter 
202
 Ferrarone and Stoller, PPHC Case Study, supra note 118, at 10.  
203 See Jennifer Russano, Is Boutique Medicine a New Threat, 
supra note 41, at 323.
204
 Another example is the cataract clinic in India mentioned in an 
article generally supportive of concierge care.  The author mentions a 
“scenario whereby the profits from the boutique practiced were used to 
finance a second practice that provided the same service, same world-
class technology and cutting edge methods, minus a few of the red 
carpet frills to the population of poor patients. A fantasy? Hardly, it 
exists right now, in India in a practice founded by Dr. Govindappa 
Venkataswamy over twenty five years ago. His Aravind Eye Hospital is 
now performing 180,000 cataract operations a year, 70 percent of them 
for free.” Justin C. Matus, Boutique Medicine: Good medicine with a 
bad taste or just bad medicine? , available at
http://www.aameda.org/MemberServices/Exec/Articles/winter03/bouti
quemedMatus.pdf , citing JOAN MAGRETTA, WHAT MANAGEMENT IS 
(2002).   
205
 Oklahoma has, for instance, considered taxing specialty 
hospitals directly.  S.B. 621, 2003 Leg., 49th Sess. (Okla. 2003); H.B. 
1188, 2003 Leg., 49th Sess. (Okla. 2003).  Specialty hospitals have 
raised concerns because they divert the most lucrative cases to 
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development may raise even more serious concerns regarding 
access to care, since cash-only practices often consist of a very 
small number of clients paying a very large retainer.  For 
example, under one Seattle plan, each physician takes on 50 
families per year, at a cost of 20,000 per family, grossing one 
million dollars per year.  Because of their extremely restricted 
scope, these practices raise concerns similar to those raised by 
amenity services: namely, the diversion of medical resources to 
nonmedical ends.206
VII. CONCLUSION
Most of the physicians pioneering retainer practices are 
committed professionals whose first priority is providing quality 
health care.  Unfortunately, what is professionally and personally 
rewarding for these doctors may harm society as a whole.  
specialized centers that usually do not provide the level of community 
services expected from general hospitals.  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, SPECIALTY HOSPITALS: GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION, SERVICES 
PROVIDED, AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCES, GAO REP. NO. 04-167 
(Oct. 2003); William Lynk and Carina Longely, The Effect of Physician 
Owned Surgicenters on Hospital Outpatient Surgery, 21(4) HEALTH 
AFF. 215 (Jul./Aug. 2002); FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 
68, at 918 (discussing state taxation and regulation of specialty 
hospitals).
206
 The nonmedical end here is the absolute assurance of the 
retainer customers that they will be able to call on their retained 
physician in case of illness.  Steven Flier of PPHC reports that, even 
with a panel of 300 patients, he has never had two conflicting demands 
on his time in his 3 years of retainer practice.  Stoller and Ferrarone, 
Personal Physicians Healthcare, supra note 118, at 12.  Demanding a 
panel of one-sixth this size (as one very exclusive Seattle practice does) 
makes the physician retained less a doctor than a courtier, whose 
primary value derives not from the medical services offered but rather 
from the sense of assurance and superiority flowing from the client’s 
ability to “reserve” the time of a skilled professional so absolutely. See
Friedman, supra note 156 (“[I]sn't there a decreasing rate of return on 
the amount of time spent with a single patient? At some point, paying 
more attention to someone won't really make him or her healthier; it 
will just satisfy a desire to be pampered. The new practice could end up 
being more about extravagant service for relatively wealthy people than 
about effective medical care.”).  
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Retainer medicine raises difficult policy questions because it 
combines a set of eminently sensible incentives (for more 
primary care physicians providing a higher quality of care) with 
financing methods that further stratify access to care and threaten 
to generate a positional bidding war for supplemental, provider-
sponsored insurance.   
So far, legal disputes over concierge care have focused on 
whether retainer payments constitute “balance billing” for 
services covered by Medicare.  This article has suggested a way 
to resolve that issue, by disaggregating retainer services into 
preventive care, queue-jumping, and amenity-bundling.  To the 
extent a retainer practice can plausibly claim that its patients’ 
retainers are funding noncovered preventive care and amenities, 
they should be safe from liability for balance billing.  But to the 
extent the retainer is funding quicker access to better care, it is a 
second charge for services already covered by insurance.
Given the importance of queue-jumping to the boutique 
medicine business model, most retainers would constitute 
balance billing under the approach proposed in this article.  
Federal regulators could leverage such violations into more 
aggressive efforts to discourage retainer practices, including 
prosecution under the False Claims Act.  For now, though, such 
a strategy appears ill-advised.  Regulation of retainer care should 
instead focus on a targeted discouragement of queue-jumping 
and amenity-bundling via taxation.  Such an approach would 
only raise the price of retainer care, and not ban it outright.  
Moreover, it could be neutral toward (or perhaps even subsidize) 
personalized preventive care.
Of course, a nuanced approach should not be a 
complacent one.  Left unregulated, the battle between cost-
cutting insurers and revenue-maximizing doctors may result in 
inefficiencies bordering on cruelty.  As the commodification of 
medicine advances, we might see hints of its future development 
in service industries where business imperatives have been 
untrammeled by social objectives.  Consider the following 
account of fare structures and service in French railways: 
It is not because of the few thousand francs which 
would have to be spent to put a roof over the third-
class carriages or to upholster the third-class seats 
that some company or other has open carriages with 
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wooden benches . . . .What the company is trying to 
do is to prevent the passengers who can pay the 
second-class fare from travelling third class; it hits 
the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to 
frighten the rich . . . . And it is again for the same 
reason that the companies, having proved almost 
cruel to third-class passengers and mean to the 
second-class ones, become lavish in dealing with 
first-class passengers. Having refused the poor what 
is necessary, they give the rich what is 
superfluous.207
As “budgetary crises” lead to further cuts in Medicaid, the 
uninsured “third-class” of American health care consumers is 
sure to suffer more privations.208  Managed care has made the 
“second-class” insured uncomfortable enough to find the 
blandishments of “first class” retainer care appealing, even at a 
price tag of several thousand dollars annually.  Given positional 
pressures to “keep up with the Joneses,” the well-off (or those 
who would like to appear so) are likely to find retainer care a 
necessary accoutrement of their social station—or at least a way 
of controlling their schedule in a manner expected of 
contemporary professionals.
There is no doubt they will be getting value for their 
money: most retainer physicians are committed to providing the 
207 Jules Dupuit, On Tolls and Transport Charges 23 (International 
Economic Papers No. 11, Elizabeth Henderson trans., 1962), quoted in 
James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price 
Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV.
2007 (2000).  See also BARBARA EHRENREICH, FEAR OF FALLING: THE 
INNER LIFE OF THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS 34 (1989) (discussing 
the role fear plays in motivating class distinctions).  
208 See Bob Herbert, Curing Health Care Costs: Let the Sick 
Suffer, N.Y. Times (Sept. 1, 2005) (describing cuts to TennCare 
program); WALL ST. J., Taming the Medicaid Monster, Aug. 23, 2005; 
Gardiner Harris, Gee, Fixing Welfare Seemed Like a Snap, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 19, 2005, 4.  Though many Medicaid “reformers” claim that 
increasing spending on the program amounts to a “fiscal crisis,”   they 
appear hesitant to admit the degree to which the 
”crisis” arises from discretionary choices to cut taxes on income not 
derived from labor. 
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highest quality of primary care.  But as those fortunate enough to 
opt for retainer care exit the dominant system, those left behind 
lose a powerful voice for reform within it.  Those who pay 
retainer fees “jump the queue” of rationing tacitly imposed by 
managed care, and provide a market for the bundling of basic or 
preventive health care with luxurious amenities.  Targeted 
regulation may not eliminate these effects, but it can check them.
